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This dissertation examines three different but related aspects of educational
voucher programs.
An introductory chapter describes the relevant questions in the literature, and
draws a connecting line between the three essays that follow.
Next, Tomás Rau, Sergio Urzúa and I examine a fundamental question in
the voucher literature, that relates to the effects that vouchers have on the stu-
dents who use them. We advance the literature by focusing not only on short-term
outcomes, but also on long-term educational outcomes, namely college admission
exams, college enrollment, and college degree attainment. We apply our analysis to
administrative panel data from Chile, and find that vouchers have positive effects
on test scores (0.07 and 0.01 standard deviations on verbal and math, respectively),
which translate into important effects on college-related outcomes, especially on the
likelihood that a student attends college. We also find substantial heterogeneity
in the estimated effects, where in general low-ability students benefit more from
vouchers than high-ability students.
In the chapter that follows, I study an aspect often overlooked in the literature:
schools’ responses to voucher policies. Using an equilibrium model of demand and
supply of elementary schools in Chile, I empirically examine private schools’ voucher
program participation and tuition decisions under voucher regimes. I focus on uni-
versal (available to all students) and targeted (available only to low-income students)
vouchers. I find that higher targeted voucher subsidies attract more schools to par-
ticipate in the voucher program, but that high-quality schools join the program
only if the subsidy is sufficiently high. I also find that targeted voucher policies
have an almost negligible effect on schools’ tuition setting. In contrast, schools’
substantially respond in prices to universal voucher policies. Specifically, a $1 dollar
increase in the universal voucher translate into a $0.58 decrease in average tuition.
Consequences for students’ school choices are also documented.
In the last chapter, I study another form of schools’ responses to voucher poli-
cies, that relates to schools’ strategic behavior to comply with some of the voucher
programs’ requirements. A targeted voucher program in Chile requires that partici-
pating schools meet specific academic goals in the form of schools’ own average scores
in standardized tests. Using rich administrative panel data from Chile, I show that
schools engaged in a strategic behavior to meet the academic requirements: they
kept their lowest-performing students from taking the standardized tests. Specifi-
cally, I find that low-performing students are 20% less likely to take the tests due
to the program. Moreover, the program does not have an effect on the likelihood
that high-performing students take the tests. Implications of this result for public
policy and research are discussed.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Dissertation
Educational or school vouchers are usually defined as government-supplied
coupons that are used by students to offset tuition at eligible private schools (Ep-
ple et al., 2017). The grounds of market-based educational vouchers were initially
laid out by Friedman (1955, 1962), who invited for a revision of the role of govern-
ment in education. He argued that, although externalities and financial constraints
justify the financing of education by the State, it is harder to make the case for
the government to be involved in the actual provision of education. He proposed
the use of vouchers that families can redeem for educational services at approved
institutions of their choice. Further, these educational institutions may well be of
private for-profit and nonprofit nature. Friedman thus called for limiting the role
of government in assuring that the institutions that render the educational services
meet certain minimum standards. As a result, he argued, competitive forces would
lead to a more efficient delivery of education, and to the proliferation of a wide
variety of schools that satisfy the preferences of families.
With a long list of proponents and detractors, the reality is that educational
vouchers have become an increasingly important aspect of modern educational sys-
tems. Countries as diverse as Chile, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, New
1
Zealand, India, Colombia, and the United States have all implemented forms of
educational voucher programs. In fact, there are currently about sixty five different
voucher programs in operation only in the United States (Epple et al., 2017). This
explosion of voucher experiences has attracted the attention of both researchers and
policy advocates, who in turn have significantly contributed to our understanding
of the consequences of this type of policies. However, the inherent complexity of
educational systems, combined with the diversity of the actual voucher programs
themselves, has left many questions still to be answered.
Motivated by the existing gaps in the literature, this dissertation examines
three different but related aspects of educational vouchers. Chapter 2, written in
collaboration with Tomás Rau and Sergio Urzúa, studies a fundamental question
in the literature, that relates to the effects that vouchers have on the students who
use them. We focus on long-term educational outcomes, thus expanding the current
literature, that focuses mostly on the short-term test score effects of vouchers. We
find an important effect of vouchers on college-related outcomes, especially on the
likelihood that a student enrolls in a higher education institution. More importantly,
we show that the effects of vouchers are heterogeneous among students, where in
general low-ability students benefit more from attending a voucher school than high-
ability students.
Once the existence of positive and heterogenous effects of vouchers has been
documented, the study of policies promoting vouchers follows naturally. Chapter
3 examines, in a market equilibrium setting, how different voucher policies affect
the decisions of both students and schools. It pays special attention to schools’
2
responses to policies, an aspect often overlooked in the literature, but that is key to
understand the mechanisms through which voucher programs operate. I show that
targeted voucher policies, that offer vouchers only to disadvantaged students, do a
decent job in expanding these students’ school choice sets. However, I also show
that high-quality private schools do not join the voucher program unless the subsidy
they receive is sufficiently high. This finding is novel in the literature, and can help
reconcile the positive effects of vouchers I find in chapter 2 with the null or even
negative effects found in other studies (see e.g. Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2018).
Chapter 4 complements the study of schools’ responses to voucher policies,
by examining whether schools’ strategic behavior can masquerade the true effects
of certain policies. In particular, I show that the recent introduction of a targeted
voucher program in Chile, which required participating schools to meet specific av-
erage test score goals, led schools to keep many of their low-performing students
from taking the corresponding tests. Specifically, I find that low-performing stu-
dents reduced their participation in the tests by about 20% due to the program. In
contrast, high-performing students were as likely to take the tests after the intro-
duction of the program as they were before. This unexpected response of schools
has important policy implications, especially in a context where schools’ test scores
are used by the government to guide many of its policies, and by families to choose
schools. It also highlights the importance of understanding schools’ incentives and
motivations when designing successful voucher programs.
I use the context of Chile to address all research questions in this dissertation.
Chile is a particularly interesting case to study vouchers. Since 1981, its primary
3
and secondary education systems operate under a nationwide voucher program,
where students exercise unrestricted choice among public and private schools. Each
student is entitled to a voucher that is redeemed at the school of her choice, and
that covers all or part of the school’s tuition. Schools, on the other hand, use the
vouchers they receive to fund their operations.
Until 2007, Chile’s voucher program followed a universal design. Under such
a design, all students are eligible to receive vouchers, and all schools participate in
the program (Epple et al., 2017).1 In the first phase of its implementation, Chile’s
program did not allow schools to charge any tuition other than the voucher. A
legislation passed in 1994 reversed that mandate, allowing private schools to charge
a copayment to parents. Today, about half of private schools charge a top-up fee or
copayment (Gazmuri, 2015; Sánchez, 2018b).
In 2008, the Chilean government introduced a second source of subsidy in the
form of a targeted voucher. This new voucher came to complement the original
universal voucher, and was aimed to expand low-income students’ school choice
sets. Under the targeted program, each disadvantaged student is eligible to receive
a targeted voucher, that can be redeemed at any participating school. Schools are
invited to participate in the targeted program, and those deciding to join receive the
targeted voucher on top of the universal voucher for every disadvantaged student
that they enroll, with the requirement that they do not charge tuition to those
students (but can still charge any amount to non-disadvantaged). Today, all public
1In practice, a small group of private schools were allowed not to join the program. These
schools are consequently very expensive, and represent about 8% of total enrollment (Gauri, 1998;
Bravo et al., 2010; Sánchez, 2018b).
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schools and about two thirds of subsidized private schools participate in the targeted
voucher program, and enroll about 90% of disadvantaged students (Sánchez, 2018b).
The essays presented in this dissertation benefit from Chile’s long experience
with vouchers in many ways. Chapter 2 leverages Chile’s experience with the uni-
versal voucher to study whether the use of vouchers allows students to attain better
long-term educational outcomes. Chapter 3 takes advantage of Chile’s simultane-
ous implementation of the universal and targeted vouchers to examine whether and
how schools respond to policies affecting each of the vouchers, and to quantify the
equilibrium effects of such policies. Chapter 4 examines schools’ behavior before
and after the introduction of Chile’s targeted voucher program to learn about how
this particular policy affected schools’ strategic behavior.
In the chapters that follow, I elaborate on the theoretical and empirical con-
siderations of educational vouchers. Each chapter draws upon broader themes in the
literature, and expands our current knowledge on the corresponding matter. The
following chapters also help distinguish the features of voucher programs that are
beneficial for students and the efficiency of educational systems from those that are
detrimental. The lessons from this dissertation have important consequences for the
design of successful voucher programs.
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Chapter 2: The Short- and Longer-Term Effects of Vouchers: Evi-
dence from Chile
Note: This chapter is coauthored with Tomás Rau and Sergio Urzúa.
2.1 Introduction
A fundamental question in the literature of educational vouchers relates to
the effects that vouchers have on the students who use them (Epple et al., 2017).
Consequently, a number of studies have emerged to answer this question, mostly
focusing on the short-run test scores effects of attending a voucher school.1 The
evidence is inconclusive, although the majority of the studies show that vouchers do
little to students’ performance (Epple et al., 2017). An arguably more important
array in this question, but that has attracted much less attention from researchers,
is whether vouchers affect longer-term outcomes, such as high-school graduation,
college enrollment, college degree attainment, and even labor market outcomes. This
paper directly addresses this question by investigating the effects that attending a
voucher high school in Chile has on students’ performance in college admission
1See Rouse (1998), Angrist et al. (2002), Mayer et al. (2002), Peterson et al. (2003), Wolf et
al. (2010a), Lara et al. (2011), Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015), Mills and Wolf (2017),
Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2018), among others.
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exams, college enrollment, and college degree attainment.2
Chile is an interesting scenario to study vouchers. With its more than thirty
years of experience with a nationwide voucher program, it constitutes one of world’s
most important large-scale experiments of educational choice (Epple et al., 2017).3
Since its inception in 1981, the basic aspects of the system have remained fairly
unchanged, with students exercising unrestricted choice among public and subsidized
private schools.4 Each student is entitled to a voucher that is directly paid to the
school of her choice, and that covers all or part of the school’s tuition.5 Schools, on
the other hand, use the vouchers they receive to fund their operations.
In this paper, we posit a sequential model of schooling decisions and outcomes,
that incorporates all essential decision stages that students face as they go through
the educational system, starting with the decision of attending a voucher school. Our
model is a generalization of the well-studied Roy model (Roy, 1951; Heckman and
Honoré, 1990), where individuals are assumed to make their decisions by comparing
the net benefits associated to each of the alternatives at hand.6 Further, we allow for
both observed and unobserved characteristics to influence decisions and outcomes,
2There is a small, but growing, literature that has analyzed the effects of vouchers on longer-
term educational outcomes, mainly high school graduation and college enrollment. These studies
include Angrist et al. (2006), Wolf et al. (2010b), and Chingos and Peterson (2015).
3Gauri (1998) describes Chile’s voucher system as “...perhaps the world’s most ambitious at-
tempt to design and implement a program of educational choice...”.
4In 2008, the Chilean government introduced an important reform to its voucher system, that,
among other things, created a differentiated voucher for low-income students. However, since my
data covers a period that precedes this reform, I do not go into the details of the implied changes
in the system’s structure. See Correa et al. (2014), Gazmuri (2015), Feigenberg et al. (2017),
Navarro-Palau (2017), Murnane et al. (2017), Neilson (2017), and Sánchez (2018a) for studies that
analyze this reform.
5Public schools are mandated to be tuition-free. Subsidized private schools are allowed to charge
tuition; however, only few of them charge any amount to its students (Gazmuri, 2015; Sánchez,
2018b).
6See, also, Willis and Rosen (1979).
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and our identification strategy facilitates the interpretation of students’ unobserved
heterogeneity as a combination of inherent scholastic abilities (Carneiro et al., 2003;
Hansen et al., 2004; Heckman et al., 2006a). In addition, the model allows us to
recover the distribution of the treatment effects associated to attending a voucher
school.7
We fit our model to a panel of administrative data from Chile, that tracks
individuals from middle school to the completion of their education. We use the
model, its estimates, and simulations to compute a variety of treatment parameters
for the effects of attending a voucher high school. We also compute the distribution
of the corresponding treatment parameters. We find that attending a voucher high
school has positive effects on college admission test scores, with average treatment
effects of 0.07σ and 0.01σ for verbal and math, respectively.8 We also find positive
effects of vouchers on the probability of enrolling in college, with an average treat-
ment effect of 1.9 percentage points (p.p.), out of a base of 57%. Finally, we find
that attending a voucher high school increases the probability of graduating from
college (conditional on having enrolled in college) for students actually attending
voucher high schools in about 1.2 p.p., but decreases such probability for students
actually attending public high schools in about 3.3 p.p. We explain this last result
by conjecturing that attending a voucher high school increases the chances not only
of enrolling in college, but also of enrolling in higher-quality and more academically
7This is in contrast to other approaches, such as instrumental variables, difference-in-difference,
and regression discontinuity, from which one can only identify specific treatment parameters, but
not their entire distribution. See the discussions in Heckman et al. (2006b), Heckman and Vytlacil
(2007), and Heckman and Urzua (2010).
8Standard deviation units are represented by σ.
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challenging colleges. In such institutions, graduation strongly depends on students’
endowments and family background, which students in public high schools usually
lack. We also find substantial heterogeneity in the treatment effects, with low-ability
students in general benefitting more of attending a voucher school than high-ability
students.
This paper contributes to the large literature of educational vouchers.9 More
specifically, it adds to the small but growing set of papers that study the effects of
vouchers on long-term outcomes. The evidence from the United States include Wolf
et al. (2010b,a), Chingos and Peterson (2015), and Chingos (2018). Using data from
the Washington DC Opportunity Scholarship Program, Wolf et al. (2010b,a) report
that, while the program is shown to have no significant impact on short-run test
scores, it substantially improved students’ chances of graduating from high school,
with an estimated effect of about 21 p.p. (from a base of 70%).10 In contrast, subse-
quent evidence from the program shows no significant effects on college enrollment
(Chingos, 2018). A similar result is found for the New York School Choice Schol-
arships Foundation (SCSF) Program. Chingos and Peterson (2015) show that the
SCSF program had no significant impact on college enrollment or degree attainment
for the population of students that received a voucher offer. However, when looking
at heterogeneous effects, they find significant effects for some subgroups. In partic-
ular, they show that the program increased the likelihood that African Americans
9See Epple et al. (2017) for a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical literature
on educational vouchers.
10The reported effect of 21 p.p. corresponds to the local average treatment effect (LATE), where
random assignment of the voucher offer is used as an instrument for voucher school attendance.
The intent-to-treat (ITT) effect is 12 p.p.
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enroll in college (6 p.p., from a base of 42%) and obtain a college degree (3 p.p.,
from a base of 6%). The question of why the large effects on high school graduation
do not translate into differences in college enrollment and degree attainment for the
D.C. program remains a puzzle, and further research should be directed towards
finding the mechanisms that help explain this result. Although, some may argue
that the real puzzle is on the large high school graduation effects, given the nonex-
istent impact on short-run test scores.11 This paper’s evidence from Chile, on the
other hand, shows a consistent trend for the voucher effects, where positive effects
on test scores translate into positive effects on college enrollment and graduation
(for treated individuals).
Angrist et al. (2006) look at the long-term effects of the PACES program in
Colombia, a government initiative that offered students vouchers to attend private
secondary schools in the nineties. This is perhaps the program with the most positive
effects in the voucher literature. After a first study showing ninth-grade test score
effects of 0.2σ (Angrist et al., 2002), Angrist et al. (2006) find that test scores
in high-stakes college entrance exams also increased by 0.2σ due to the program,
and that voucher recipients were 15-20 percent more likely to graduate from high
school. Some of the requirements of the PACES program, however, make it difficult
to attribute all of the effects of the program to the vouchers alone. In particular,
the vouchers were renewable contingent on grade completion, and thus the program
11Epple et al. (2017) interpret the evidence from the United States as being consistent with
vouchers improving some types of skills more than others. In particular, they argue that it is
possible that vouchers improve noncognitive skills, which may explain the positive effects on high
school graduation (Heckman et al., 2006a, 2016b), while the lack of an effect on test scores may be
the result of weaker impacts on cognitive skills. Though plausible, this interpretation falls short
in explaining the zero effects on college enrollment and degree attainment.
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included a strong incentive component. The program also required that students
had already been accepted in a private school before applying to the program. As
a result, not only were the voucher recipients very likely to attend private schools
(94%), but so were the students in the control group (88%). This is in contrast with
our context, where the treatment and counterfactual are clearly defined as using
vouchers to attend a private school, and attending a school in the public sector,
respectively, as is the case in most of the studies in the literature.
In a study using the Chilean case, Bravo et al. (2010) investigate the long-
term effects on schooling and work choices, and earnings, of the introduction of the
universal voucher reform in 1981. They fit a structural dynamic model of education
and labor market choices and outcomes on a sample of individuals that were differ-
entially exposed to the voucher system while at school, i.e. some students attended
school after the new regime was introduced, some experience their schooling both
before and after the reform, and others attended school only before the voucher
system was in place. Using their simulated model, they show that the reform in-
creased high school graduation and the likelihood of completing at least two years
of college. They also show that earnings inequality decreased and lifetime utility
increased due to the reform. These results are encouraging, but as is the case with
the PACES program, it is hard to disentangle the true effect of the vouchers from
the other components of the reform.12 For instance, the reform also included the
decentralization of the public schools, and transferred their management from the
12It is worth noting that the authors are well aware of this aspect of their study, and are careful
in attributing the effects they find to the school reform as a whole, and not only to its school choice
component.
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central government to the municipalities (Gauri, 1998). Lastly, the education and
labor sectors were impacted by many other shocks unrelated but contemporaneous
to the voucher reform, putting additional noise to the interpretation of the results.13
Finally, this paper fits into a literature that uses structural and semi-structural
models to estimate economically interpretable and policy-relevant treatment effects.
This literature uses a variety of sources of identification, including exclusion re-
strictions, conditional independence assumptions about unobservables, and func-
tional form assumptions. It also identifies causal effects at well-defined margins of
choice, and can evaluate the impacts of policies that have not yet been implemented
(Heckman, 2010; Heckman and Urzua, 2010; Heckman et al., 2016b). This paper’s
methodology is closest to Aakvik et al. (2005), Sarzosa and Urzúa (2015), Heck-
man et al. (2016b), Rodŕıguez et al. (2016), and Prada and Urzúa (2017) in that
literature.
This paper is organized as follows. After this introduction, Section 3.2 briefly
describes Chile’s universal voucher system. Section 2.3 presents the various data
sets we use, and discusses the construction of our sample. Section 3.4 presents our
empirical model of schooling decisions and outcomes, and discusses its identification
and estimation strategy. Section 2.5 presents the empirical implementation of the
model. Section 3.5 presents our results. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes.
13Most notably, the country suffered a major economic crisis in 1982.
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2.2 Chile’s Universal Voucher System: A Brief Overview
Since 1981, Chile’s educational system operates under a nationwide voucher
agenda. It combines families’ preferences with (public and private) schools com-
petition for attracting students. Funding comes from the government, that pays
voucher subsidies directly to the schools. Residential restrictions are nonexistent,
and therefore students can attend any school that they are willing to travel to (and
pay for).
For the period that our data spans, the educational system operated under
a universal voucher design. That is, all public and almost all private schools par-
ticipate in the program, which implies that they fund their operations through a
per-student voucher subsidy that they receive directly from the government. Par-
ticipating private schools are also allowed to charge a complementary fee to parents,
although only about half of them opt to do so (Gazmuri, 2015). Every student, poor
and rich, is entitled to a voucher that can be used to pay part or all of the tuition
charged by voucher schools.
A third group of schools exists, and includes private schools that do not par-
ticipate in the voucher program, and therefore do not receive subsidies from the
government. Students cannot use their vouchers to offset tuition at these schools,
and as a result the fees charged by the non-voucher schools are about ten times
higher than the fees charged by the private-voucher schools (Sánchez, 2018b). The
share of students attending the non-voucher schools is only about 8% (Bravo et al.,
2010; Sánchez, 2018a). For our empirical analysis, we follow the standard practice
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in the related literature, and disregard this group of schools (Contreras et al., 2010;
Lara et al., 2011; Correa et al., 2014). We therefore focus our analysis only on the
public and private-voucher schools, that include all of the schools that are part of
the voucher system, and that enroll more than 90% of the student population.14
2.3 Data
Our sample consists in the universe of 8th grade students enrolled in public
primary schools that do not offer secondary grades, in the year 2000. The majority
of these students are 14 years old by then. We follow these students through high
school. Once graduated from high school, we observe whether they take the national
college admission exams, and if so their performance on the exams. Then, regardless
of whether they take the admission exams, we observe whether they enroll in college.
Lastly, for students enrolled in college, we observe whether they complete their
degree on or before their 30th birthday (year 2016).
To understand our selection criteria, it is worth noting some institutional as-
pects of Chile’s education system. Primary education consists in grades 1st–8th,
and secondary education consists in grades 9th–12th. Schools, public and private,
offer either only primary education grades, only secondary education grades, or both
primary and secondary education grades. As a consequence, students enrolled in
schools offering only primary grades are forced to choose a new school to pursue their
secondary education. The new school may be one that offers only secondary edu-
14For a more detailed description of the universal voucher system in Chile, see Gauri (1998),
and McEwan and Carnoy (2000).
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cation grades or both primary and secondary education grades. For these students
(and their families), the period right after completing 8th grade is of intensive school
shopping. This is in contrast with students enrolled in schools offering both primary
and secondary grades, where the end of 8th grade is not too different than the end
of 7th or 9th grades, and consequently the majority of these students continue their
secondary education in the same school they attend in 8th grade. For this reason,
and since we are interested in students’ high school decisions, we restrict our analysis
to students enrolled in schools offering only primary education grades. Furthermore,
we follow Lara et al. (2011), and drop students enrolled in private primary schools.
Thus we focus our analysis on arguably the most vulnerable students, for whom the
public policy lessons we draw from this paper are most relevant. Additionally, and
as discussed in section 3.2, we follow the related literature and disregard students
enrolling in private-non-voucher high schools (Contreras et al., 2010; Lara et al.,
2011; Correa et al., 2014). These schools do not take up vouchers and have strict
admission requirements, and therefore are not part of the school choice framework
of public and private-voucher schools. Only about 2% of students in primary public
schools that do not offer secondary grades pursue their secondary education in a
private-non-voucher high school. Next, and because we do not have information on
the high school attended for students that do not earn a high school diploma, we
decide to disregard these students. They represent about 13% of students. In a final
step, we only keep observations with no missing covariates. This last step brings
our final sample size from 95,802 to 66,009.
Our data come from the national standardized exams for primary and sec-
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ondary education levels (SIMCE), the censuses of students and schools, the na-
tional standardized college admission exams (PSU), the census of students attending
higher education institutions, and the census of students earning a higher educa-
tion degree. We use several years for each of these data sets, spanning the period
1998-2016. In addition, we use data from the 2003, 2006, and 2009 versions of
the national household survey (CASEN) to construct the instruments we use as
part of our identification strategy. These variables relate to the local availability of
private-voucher schools, local labor market tightness and opportunities, and local
availability of higher education institutions. See appendix A for a more detailed
description of each of the data sets we use.
2.4 A Sequential Model of Schooling Decisions and Outcomes
We postulate a model of sequential schooling decisions, that starts with the
choice of whether to enroll in a private-voucher or public high school, and is fol-
lowed by all major schooling decisions the student makes thereon, including taking
the college admission exams, enrolling in college, and obtaining a college degree. Fig-
ure 2.1 displays the complete diagram of the decisions incorporated in our model.
We adjoin students’ performance in the college admission exams to our sequential
schooling decisions model.
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Notes: This figure displays the multistage decision process we incorporate in our model. Node
D1 relates to the decision of attending a private-voucher or a public high school. Nodes D2 and
D3 relate to the decision of whether to take the college admission exams. Nodes D4–D7 relate to
the decision of whether to enroll in college. Nodes D8–D11 relate to the decision of whether to
graduate from college. A terminal node is denoted by a dot at the end of a branch.
Our model is a generalization of the Roy framework (Roy, 1951; Heckman
and Honoré, 1990). We characterize each schooling decision using a flexible dis-
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crete choice model, and recognize that individuals make decisions by taking into
account the consequences of their choices. In that sense, our model approximates a
dynamic discrete choice model without being explicit about the precise rules used
by individuals or about their information sets.15 On the other hand, and similar to
reduced-form strategies, we use exclusion restrictions as a source of identification.
However, unlike that literature, we are able to define a variety of treatment effects at
well-defined margins of choice. We also allow for unobserved heterogeneity to play a
key role in determining choices and outcomes. Moreover, we are able to interpret the
unobserved heterogeneity as a combination of students’ inherent scholastic abilities,
following the identification argument in Carneiro et al. (2003), and Hansen et al.
(2004).16
2.4.1 Schooling Decisions and Counterfactual Outcomes
Let Dj′|j denote the decision of attaining schooling level j
′ given that the
student attained schooling level j. For instance, Dj′|j may denote the decision of
graduating from college given that the student enrolled in college (nodes D8–D11




1 if Ij′|j ≥ 0
0 otherwise,
15See the discussion in Taber (2000), Cameron and Taber (2004), and Heckman et al. (2016b).
16See, also, Heckman et al. (2006a), Urzua (2008), Rau et al. (2013), and Rodŕıguez et al. (2016).
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where Ij′|j is the perceived value of attaining schooling level j
′ for a student with
schooling level j.
In addition, we model performance in college admission exams for individuals
deciding to take the exams. In the context of our application and diagram of deci-
sions (Figure 2.1), let Y kj′ be the score in exam of subject k for a student attaining
schooling level j′ ∈ {4, 6} (i.e. deciding to take the exams). Then,
Y k = Dj′|jY
k
j′ , for j
′ = 4, 6 and j′|j ∈ {4|2} ∪ {6|3}
is the observed exam k score. In other words, the scores are observed only if the
student reaches node j′ ∈ {4, 6}.
2.4.2 Parameterization and Assumptions About Unobservables
We use a linear-in-the-parameters model to approximate student’s perceived
value of transitioning from schooling level j to schooling level j′,
Ij′|j = Zj′|jγj′|j + θλj′|j + νj′|j,
where Zj′|j is a vector of contemporaneous observed variables that affect the school-
ing decision, θ is student’s unobserved (to the econometrician) heterogeneity, and
νj′|j is an idiosyncratic error term. Notice that we do not impose forward-looking
behavior or any type of rationality, which adds flexibility to our model, at the cost
of not being able to identify fully structural preference parameters.
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We also use a linear-in-the-parameters formulation to model the performance
in college admission exams,
Y kj′ = X
Y βk + θαk + η
k
j′ ,
where XY is a vector of observed variables determining test scores, and ηkj′ is an
idiosyncratic error term.
The individual’s unobserved heterogeneity plays an important role in our
methodology.17 In particular, we assume that, after controlling for observables, the
unobserved heterogeneity drives all statistical dependence between the equations in
our model. That is, if the researcher were able to observe θ, she could use matching
on (Z,X, θ) to fully identify the model (Carneiro et al., 2003).18
Let⊥⊥ denote statistical independence. We assume that, conditional on (Z,X),





j′′ , for any j
′ 6= j′′, k 6= k′
ν ⊥⊥ η,
(ν, η) ⊥⊥ θ,
where ν is the stacked vector of all νj′|j terms, and η is the stacked vector of all η
k
j′
terms. In addition, we assume that all unobservables are statistically independent
17This is a common feature of the literature on dynamic discrete choice models. See, for example,
Keane and Wolpin (1997), and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010).
18(Z,X) denotes the stacked vector of all observables.
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from the observable variables, i.e (ν, η, θ) ⊥⊥ (Z,X).
2.4.3 Measurement System for the Unobserved Heterogeneity
We adjoin to our model a measurement system of equations to help identify
the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity, θ, as well as to facilitate its inter-
pretation. Notice that the use of a measurement system is not strictly necessary for
the model of schooling decisions and outcomes to be identified, and we could instead
treat the unobserved heterogeneity as a nuisance or random effect, as is usual in the
structural literature (see, e.g., Keane and Wolpin, 1997, and Aguirregabiria and
Mira, 2010). However, the use of a measurement system allows us to give a clear
interpretation to the unobserved factor as a proxy of the measurements (Carneiro
et al., 2003; Hansen et al., 2004).
The measurement system is given by,
Ml = X
Mδl + θψl + εl,
where Ml is the l-th measurement, X
M is a vector of observed variables determining
the measurement, and εl is an idiosyncratic error term. Notice that the measure-
ments do not depend on the schooling levels, and therefore are observed for all
students independent of their schooling choices. In practice, we use measurements
taken before the student makes the decisions relevant to our model.
In addition to the independence assumptions mentioned above, we assume
that εl ⊥⊥ εl′ |(Z,X) for any l 6= l′, and that εl ⊥⊥ (Z,X, θ, ν, η).
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2.4.4 Identification
The main argument for identification of our model uses a version of matching,
and follows Heckman et al. (2016a). If θ were observed, then we could condition
on (Z,X, θ), and identify all parts of the model. Since θ is not observed, we use
the measurement system to proxy θ, and allow for measurement error captured by
ε = (ε1, . . . , εL). Using the conditions presented in Heckman et al. (2016a), we
can nonparametrically identify our model, including the distributions of θ and ε.
This last part in the identification requires that we have at least three measure-
ment equations for a one-dimensional factor structure.19 In practice, we use four
measurements.
The factor loadings are identified up to a normalization. We set one of the
loadings in the measurement system to be equal to one, which anchors the scale of
the factor.
We also benefit from the use of instruments, that is, variables that shift the
schooling decisions but that do not enter the outcome equations. This identification
argument works even without imposing a factor structure in the error terms or
invoking the independence conditional on (Z,X, θ) assumption. See Heckman et al.
(2016a) and the papers cited therein for a formal proof of identification of a general
version of a model that shares the characteristics of ours.
19See, also, Carneiro et al. (2003), Hansen et al. (2004), and Theorem 1 in Kotlarski (1967).
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2.4.5 Estimation
We estimate the model by maximum likelihood. The conditional on (Z,X, θ)
independence of the error terms assumption is key when constructing the likelihood










f(Yi, Di | Zi, Xi, θ)f(Mi | Xi, θ)f(θ)d(θ),
where f(·) denotes a probability density function, and we integrate over the distri-
bution of the unobserved factor. We assume mean zero normal distributions for the
error terms, and approximate the distribution of the factor using a mixture of two
normals. That is,
θ ∼ pN(µ1, σ21) + (1− p)N(µ2, σ22),
where we constrain the factor mean to be zero, and p ∈ [0, 1].
We perform the estimation in two stages. First, we estimate the measurement






f(Mi | Xi, θ)f(θ)d(θ).







f(Yi, Di | Zi, Xi, θ)f̂(Mi | Xi, θ)f̂(θ)d(θ).
By proceeding the estimation in two stages, we reduce the computational time, but
also ensure that the estimation of the factor distribution is done using only the mea-
surement system, which reinforces the interpretation of the unobserved factor as a
proxy of the measurements. Moreover, since the schooling decisions, D, and out-
comes, Y , are independent of the measurement system, M , conditional on (Z,X, θ),
we obtain consistent estimates.
We use the Gauss-Hermite quadrature for integration, and correct the second-
stage standard errors following the procedure suggested by Murphy and Topel
(1985).20
2.4.6 Definition of Treatment Effects
The model just described identifies distributions for counterfactual outcomes.
We use these counterfactuals to construct treatment effect parameters. In our con-
text, treatment is attending a private-voucher high school in lieu of a public high
school. The relative gain an individual gets from attending a private-voucher school
is Y1 − Y0. Our model allows us to obtain the distribution of those gains over the
entire population of students. We further define three different treatment effects by
averaging those gains over different subsets of the population (Heckman et al., 2001;
20See, also, Greene (2008).
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Aakvik et al., 2005).
The average treatment effect (ATE) is defined by averaging the treatment
gains over the entire student population,
ATE =
∫ ∫
E(Y1 − Y0 | X = x, θ = θ̄)dFX,θ(x, θ̄).
The average treatment effect on the treated (TT) is defined by averaging the
treatment gains over the subset of students that actually choose to be treated,
TT =
∫ ∫
E(Y1 − Y0 | X = x, θ = θ̄, D = 1)dFX,θ|D=1(x, θ̄),
where D = 1 denotes receipt of the treatment. This treatment effect informs the
average gain for students that endogenously choose to be treated, and it has partic-
ular policy relevance whenever a policymaker is interested in knowing the effect of
a policy that has a strong self-selection component. That is the case of the voucher
policy we study. Notice that this treatment effect is generally different from what
IV identifies in a context of heterogeneous treatment effects (i.e. LATE), but of-
fers an arguably clearer interpretation (Heckman et al., 2001, 2006b; Heckman and
Vytlacil, 2007).
The average treatment effect on the untreated (TUT) is defined by averaging





E(Y1 − Y0 | X = x, θ = θ̄, D = 0)dFX,θ|D=0(x, θ̄),
where D = 0 denotes non-receipt of the treatment. This treatment effect informs
the average gain for students that endogenously choose not to be treated. It has
particular policy relevance whenever a policymaker is, for example, considering an
expansion of an existing policy, which is expected to cover a larger share of the
population than it actually does.
2.5 Empirical Implementation
2.5.1 Schooling Decisions
As displayed in Figure 2.1, we model four levels of schooling choices the stu-
dents make through the course of their education: enrolling in a private-voucher high
school in lieu of a public high school, taking the college admission exams, enrolling in
college, and graduating from college (for students enrolled in college). Table 2.1 dis-
plays summary statistics for the schooling choices observed in our sample (students
that attended primary public schools offering only primary grades). About a third
of students enroll in private-voucher high schools. 47% of students take the college
admission exams. 57% of students enroll in a higher education institution. Notice
that the higher share of individuals enrolling in college than taking the admission
exams reflects the fact that most, but not all, higher education institutions require
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applicants to take the admission exams, and therefore there is a number of students
that enroll in college even without taking the exams.21 About a third of students in
our sample earn a higher education degree. Lastly, there is a considerable number
of students that drop out from college. More precisely, of the students ever enrolled
in college, only 55% are able to graduate (i.e finish their degree).
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics - Endogenous Variables
mean std. dev. min max
schooling decisions:
voucher high school 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
take college admission exams 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
college enrollment 0.57 0.49 0.00 1.00
college degreea 0.32 0.46 0.00 1.00
college graduationb 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00
college admission exams:
verbal -0.42 0.88 -3.13 2.90
math -0.43 0.86 -3.18 3.17
measurement system:
verbal -0.11 0.91 -2.81 2.90
math -0.11 0.91 -2.68 2.63
social sciences -0.11 0.92 -2.79 3.06
natural sciences -0.11 0.92 -2.76 2.81
Notes: This table displays summary statistics for the set of endogenous variables used in the
empirical implementation of our model. Test scores, both from college admission exams and the
measurement system, are normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one in the entire
population of test takers. a College degree is a dummy for earning a college degree, unconditional
on college enrollment. b College graduation is a dummy for graduating from college, conditional
on having enrolled in college.
21For a detailed description of the college admission exams, and the college admission process in
Chile, see Rau et al. (2013), Espinoza et al. (2016), Hastings et al. (2016), Rodŕıguez et al. (2016),
Espinoza (2017), and Bucarey (2018).
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2.5.2 Outcomes
We consider the following outcomes: college admission test scores, college en-
rollment, and college graduation (conditional on having enrolled in college). The
college admission tests are not mandatory, but are key in determining students’
chances of attending college, and therefore the majority of students willing to pur-
sue higher education take them. The battery of admission exams consist of two
obligatory tests, verbal and mathematics, and two optative tests, social sciences,
and sciences (biology, chemistry, physics). We consider only verbal and mathemat-
ics exams in our analysis, and normalize the scores in each subject to have mean
zero and standard deviation one among all test takers (including students that are
not part of our sample). Table 2.1 displays summary statistics for the college ad-
mission test scores in our sample. Both verbal and math distributions have negative
means, −0.42σ and −0.43σ, respectively, indicating that the students in our sample
perform on average worse than the average student in the entire population of test
takers.
The outcomes of enrolling in college, and graduating from college are part of
the schooling choices in our model, and were analyzed above.
2.5.3 Measurement System
For the measurement system, we use the 8th grade national standardized ex-
ams taken in 2000, which was the first year these tests were administered.22 The
22In 1999, a similar battery of tests were administered to 4th graders. In subsequent years,
different national standardized tests have been administered to students in 2nd, 4th, 6th, 8th,
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exams are mandatory for all students in 8th grade, and evaluate knowledge in four
subjects: verbal, mathematics, social sciences, and natural sciences. We include
all four tests as part of our measurement system. These tests help us identify the
distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity in our model, and allow us to interpret
the unobserved factor as a combination of student’s inherent scholastic abilities. In
the remainder of the paper, we also refer to the unobserved heterogeneity as ability.
We normalize each test score distribution to have mean zero and standard
deviation one in the entire population of test takers. Table 2.1 displays summary
statistics for the tests that are part of the measurement system. All four tests have
a sample mean of −0.11σ, which tell us that on average the students in our sample
perform worse than the students in the entire population.
2.5.4 Covariates
The exogenous variables we use in our model’s equations mostly reflect socio-
economic characteristics, and are common in the related education/labor literature
(see, e.g., Altonji (1993), Heckman et al. (2006a), Heckman et al. (2016b), Walters
(2017)). Table 2.2 lists the covariates we use, and displays summary statistics for
each of them. The variables for gender, parents’ education, and broken home are
measured when the students is 14 years old. The variable for broken home is a
dummy that takes the value of one if no parent or only one of them resides in
the student’s home, and zero otherwise. Income per capita variables are measured
at the household level, represent monthly figures, and are in US$ as of the year
10th, and 11th grades.
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2000. Half of our sample consists in male students. Both mothers and fathers have
on average 9 years of schooling, which represents having graduated from primary
but not from secondary education. Average monthly income per capita is around
US$42–62. Lastly, about a fifth of the students in our sample reside in the country’s
Northern region, and about half of the students reside in the Central region. The
rest reside in the South. Notice that we observe income per capita and region of
residence at ages 14 and 18.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics - Exogenous Variables
mean std. dev. min max
covariates:
male 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
mother’s education 9.0 3.3 0.0 22.0
father’s education 9.4 3.4 0.0 22.0
broken home 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00
log income per capita (age 14) 3.73 0.84 1.06 7.41
log income per capita (age 18) 4.13 0.58 1.92 7.47
region: north (age 14) 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
region: center (age 14) 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
region: north (age 18) 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
region: center (age 18) 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
exclusion restrictions:
% voucher schools in municipality 0.54 0.24 0.00 1.00
∆ local unemployment (high–low skill, age 17) -0.05 0.06 -0.27 0.26
∆ local log wage (high–low skill, age 17) 0.74 0.31 -0.39 2.55
∆ local unemployment (high–low skill, age 20) -0.03 0.06 -0.30 0.46
∆ local log wage (high–low skill, age 20) 0.74 0.28 -0.21 2.13
∆ local unemployment (high–low skill, age 23) -0.04 0.06 -0.30 0.33
∆ local log wage (high–low skill, age 23) 0.69 0.27 -0.13 2.15
college in municipality (age 21) 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00
Notes: This table displays summary statistics for the covariates used in our model. The variables
for gender, parents’ education, broken home, and % of voucher schools in the municipality are
measured when the students is 14 years old. The variable for broken home is a dummy that takes
the value of one if no parent or only one of them resides in the student’s home, and zero otherwise.
Income per capita variables are measured at the household level, represent monthly figures, and
are in log US$ as of the year 2000. The variable for % of voucher schools in the municipality refers
to the local availability of private-voucher high schools, and the reported figure is calculated taking
into account private-non-voucher high schools. The variables for local unemployment and wages
are differences in averages between high-skilled workers and low-skilled workers. The variable for
presence of a college in the municipality is a dummy that is equal to one if there is one or more
colleges in the student’s municipality of residence, and zero otherwise.
2.5.5 Exclusion Restrictions
As stated in Section 2.4.4, our model is nonparametrically identified without
the need of exclusion restrictions, and invoking a form of conditional independence
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assumption on mismeasured variables. However, we could also identify all parame-
ters in our model with the use of node-specific instruments, or variables that shift the
schooling choices but that do not enter the outcome equations. With instruments,
identification is secured even without relying on the matching-like assumption just
mentioned.
We use a variety of instruments that shift the schooling decisions. Table 2.2
lists these instruments, and provide summary statistics for each of them. The vari-
able for the percentage of voucher high schools in the municipality is measured when
the student is 14 years old. The variables for local unemployment and wages are
differences between high-skilled and low-skilled municipality averages. The variable
for presence of a college in the municipality is a dummy that is equal to one if
there is one or more colleges in the student’s municipality of residence, and zero
otherwise. On average, students live in a municipality where 54% of high schools
are private-voucher. Local unemployment rates for high-skilled individuals are on
average 3–4 percentage points lower than local unemployment rates for low-skilled
workers. On average, local wages for high-skilled workers are about twice as high as
the wages earned by low-skilled workers. Lastly, 61% of students at age 21 reside in
a municipality where one or more colleges are present. Notice that we observe many
of the instruments at different moments in the course of the student’s education.
Finally, Table 2.3 displays the exact inclusion of the covariates and instruments











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.6.1.1 Distribution of the Unobserved Heterogeneity
Figure 2.2 displays the estimates for the distribution of the unobserved het-
erogeneity. It also plots the estimated distribution. A first look at the plotted
distribution suggests its departure from the normal distribution. In particular, the
estimated distribution presents two modes, one positive and one negative. This re-
sult confirms our approach of allowing for a degree of flexibility in the distribution
of the factor.
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Ability
f ∼ pN(µ1, σ21) + (1− p)N(µ2, σ22)
where
(µ1, µ2) = (0.44,−0.08)
(σ1, σ2) = (0.58, 0.44)
p = 0.19
Notes: This figure displays the estimated distribution of the unobserved factor. Estimated param-
eters were obtained from a maximum likelihood procedure on the measurement system.
2.6.1.2 Measurement System
The estimates for the measurement system are reported in Table 2.4. Consis-
tent with other studies for the case of Chile, we find that female students outperform
35
males in verbal, but the opposite occurs in math.23 A gender effect also exists in
social sciences, favoring males. Both mother’s and father’s education are strong
determinant of students’ performance, although the effect of mother’s education is
estimated to be stronger in all subjects. Residing in a household without both par-
ents being present does not affect test scores. That is not the case for household’s
income per capita, which increases students’ performance. Residing in the Southern
region also increases test scores. Finally, the unobserved ability factor is estimated
to be a strong determinant of test scores, playing a comparable role in all subjects.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Estimates for the decision of attending a private-voucher high school in lieu
of a public high school are presented in Table 2.5. This decision corresponds to
node D1 in Figure 2.1. Males are more likely to enroll in a voucher high school.
Higher levels of mother’s education increases the likelihood that a student attends
a voucher high school. The effect of father’s education is not statistically different
from zero. Higher levels of household income also increase the likelihood of attending
a voucher school. Residing in the Northern region decreases the chances of going
to a private school, and the opposite occurs with residency in the Central region;
all, relative to residing in the South. Notice that the exclusion restriction, which
captures local availability of voucher high schools, is a strong determinant of the
decision. Lastly, higher levels of the unobserved ability increase the likelihood of
enrolling in a voucher school.
Table 2.5 also reports the estimates for the decision of taking the college ad-
mission exams, which corresponds to the nodes D2 and D3 in Figure 2.1. Female
students are more likely to take the admission exams. Both mother’s and father’s
education increase the likelihood of taking the exams. Not having both parents
at home reduces such chances. Higher levels of household’s income increase the
likelihood of taking the exams. The regional dummies estimates are statistically
significant, with a positive sign for students in voucher high schools and a nega-
tive sign for students in public high schools. We use three exclusion restrictions in
these schooling choices. The first one is the difference between the local unemploy-
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ment rate of high-skilled workers and the local unemployment rate of low-skilled
workers. The corresponding estimated coefficients are not too precise, but are of
negative sign, meaning that higher rates of high-skilled unemployment (relative to
low-skilled unemployment) lead to fewer individuals to take the college admission
exams. The second instrument we use in these equations is the difference between
the local log wage of high-skilled workers and the local log wage of low-skilled work-
ers. The estimated coefficients are statistically significant, and negative for students
in voucher high schools and positive for students in public high schools. A positive
coefficient indicates that a higher wage differential increases student’s likelihood of
taking the college admission exams. Our third instrument is the local availability of
a higher education institution. The corresponding estimated coefficients are statis-
tically significant, and positive for students in voucher high schools and negative for
students in public high schools. A positive coefficient indicates that local availability
of college increases the likelihood of taking the college admission exams. Lastly, the
loading for the unobserved ability factor is strongly positive, meaning that higher






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Estimates for the decision of enrolling in college are presented in Table 2.6.
This decision corresponds to the nodes D4–D7 in Figure 2.1. Similar to the results
for the decision of taking the college admission exams, female students are more
likely to enroll in college. Family observable endowments, i.e. parents’ education
and household’s income, strongly increase the likelihood that a student enrolls in
college. Residing in a household without both parents being present decreases the
chances of attending college. Regional dummies are mostly significant, and all nega-
tive, meaning that residing in the South increases the chances of enrolling in college.
We use the same instruments as for the decision of taking the college exams, with
the difference that local labor market conditions are measured when the student
is 20 years old. The instrument for the relative unemployment rate of high-skilled
workers is not precisely estimated, and of negative sign for students taking the col-
lege admission exams and of positive sign for student not taking the exams. The
instrument for the relative wage of high-skilled workers is negative in all equations,
but only significant for students in public high schools. The instrument for local
college availability is mostly positive and significant, indicating that having a col-
lege in the municipality of residence increases the likelihood of attending college.
Lastly, the loading for the unobserved ability factor is strongly positive and signifi-
cant, meaning that higher levels of ability increase the likelihood of pursuing higher
education. This is in line with the related existing evidence from Chile (Rau et al.,




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The decision of graduating from college is estimated only for students that
enroll in college, and its estimates are presented in Table 2.7. This decision corre-
sponds to the nodes D8-D11 in Figure 2.1. Female students are more likely than
males to graduate from college. Mother’s education is a significant determinant of
college graduation, where higher levels of education increase the likelihood of earn-
ing a college degree. That is not the case of father’s education, that has a small and
mostly insignificant effect on college graduation. Growing up in a household with-
out both parents being present decreases the chances of obtaining a college degree.
The coefficients for household’s income are only significant for students that take
the college admission exams, and indicate that higher levels of income translate into
higher chances of graduating from college. Regional dummies’ effects indicate that
residing in the South increases college graduation. We use only local labor mar-
ket instruments, measured when the individual is 23 years old. The coefficients for
the relative rate of unemployment for high-skilled workers are mostly insignificant.
Same is the case of the coefficients for the relative wage of high-skilled workers.
Lastly, the loadings for the unobserved ability factor are strongly positive, meaning
that higher levels of ability increase the chances of earning a college degree. This is,
again, in line with the related evidence (Heckman et al., 2006a, 2016b; Rau et al.,







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.6.1.4 Outcomes: College Admission Exams
We include performance in the college admission exams as outcomes in our
model. The corresponding scores are observed only for individuals taking the exams,
that is, students that reach the nodes D4 and D6 in Figure 2.1 (or, that choose
D2 = 1 and D3 = 1 in the same figure). The estimated coefficients for verbal and
math scores are presented in Table 2.8. Analogous to the results we obtained for the
measurement system, we observe that females outperform males in verbal, and that
the opposite occurs in math. Observable family endowments, i.e. parents’ education
and household’s income, are strong determinants of students’ performance, with
higher levels of family endowments increasing test scores. Growing up in a household
without both parents being present has a negative effect on performance. The
coefficients for the regional dummies indicate that residing in the South increases
test scores. Lastly, the unobserved ability factor is a strong and positive determinant






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.6.2 Goodness of Fit
Using the model and its estimates, we simulate 500,000 observations. We test
the ability of our model to reproduce the actual data. Tables 2.9–2.11 compare our
model’s predictions with the data. Table 2.9 reports comparisons for the measure-
ment system. Table 2.10 reports comparisons for schooling decisions. Table 2.11
does analogously for college admission exams. In general, our model fits the data
satisfactorily well, which allows us to use the model to compute counterfactuals,
treatment effects, and learn more about the consequences of schooling decisions (in
particular, attending a voucher high school).
Table 2.9: Goodness of Fit - Measurement System
mean std. dev.
actual model actual model
verbal -0.105 -0.106 0.912 0.908
math -0.108 -0.108 0.907 0.902
social sciences -0.112 -0.111 0.918 0.912
natural sciences -0.112 -0.112 0.920 0.916
Notes: This table compares our simulated model with the actual data. Simulations consist in
500,000 draws taken from the model and its estimates.
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Notes: This table compares our simulated model with the actual data. Simulations consist in
500,000 draws taken from the model and its estimates.
Table 2.11: Goodness of Fit - College Admission Exams
mean std. dev.
actual model actual model
voucher high school:
verbal -0.347 -0.362 0.874 0.861
math -0.400 -0.413 0.866 0.851
public high school:
verbal -0.459 -0.466 0.882 0.863
math -0.444 -0.451 0.860 0.844
Notes: This table compares our simulated model with the actual data. Simulations consist in
500,000 draws taken from the model and its estimates.
2.6.3 Effects of and Sorting on Ability
Using our simulated model, we investigate the effects of ability on outcomes.
We are interested in the outcomes of college admission exams, college enrollment,
and college graduation (conditional on having enrolled in college). Figure 2.3 plots
the effects of ability on each of the outcomes. Higher levels of ability strongly
determine higher test scores and higher chances of college enrollment and graduation.
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These results, previewed by the analysis of estimates in Section 2.6.1, and confirmed
with the analysis from the simulations, underscore the key role that inherent abilities
have on socio-economic outcomes. They also connect this paper with a growing
literature on the effects of skills (Heckman et al., 2006a, 2016b; Sarzosa and Urzúa,
2015; Prada and Urzúa, 2017; Sarzosa, 2017), and call for the importance of policies
aimed at developing those skills, especially in early stages of children’s development
(Cunha and Heckman, 2007, 2008; Cunha et al., 2010; Noboa-Hidalgo and Urzúa,
2012; Campbell et al., 2014; Heckman and Mosso, 2014).
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Figure 2.3: The Effects of Ability on Outcomes
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Notes: This figure plots nonparametric relationships between abilities and outcomes. The non-
parametric estimations are performed using the simulations from the model. College graduation
is conditional on having enrolled in college.
We also investigate how ability determines the sorting of students into interme-
diate and final schooling levels. In particular, we are interested in the sorting effect
of ability on students’ decision to attend a private-voucher high school, and on final
schooling levels (i.e. high school degree, college dropout, college degree). Figure 2.4
plots distributions of ability for students deciding to attend a private-voucher school
and for students deciding to attend a public school. The two distributions are very
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similar one from another. If anything, students in voucher schools have somewhat
higher levels of ability, but the differences are almost negligible. We conclude that
students of similar ability enroll in private-voucher schools and in public schools.
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Notes: This figure plots distributions of ability for students attending private-voucher schools and
for students attending public schools. The distributions are nonparametrically estimated using the
simulations from the model.
Figure 2.5 plots distributions of ability for students attaining the following
final schooling levels: high school degree, college dropout (i.e. enrolling in college
but not earning the degree), and college degree. The sorting on ability is clear.
Individuals earning a college degree have higher levels of ability than individuals
dropping out from college, who in turn have higher levels of ability than individuals
earning a high school diploma. These results are in line with the existing evidence on
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the role of skills in educational attainment (Heckman et al., 2006a, 2016b; Rodŕıguez
et al., 2016; Prada and Urzúa, 2017), and, again, highlight the key role of ability in
educational success.














Notes: This figure plots distributions of ability for individuals attaining three different levels of
schooling: high school degree, college dropout, and college degree. The distributions are nonpara-
metrically estimated using the simulations from the model.
2.6.4 The Effects of Vouchers
We investigate the effects of attending a private-voucher high school in lieu of
a public high school on the performance in college admission exams, the likelihood
of enrolling in college, and the likelihood of graduating from college (conditional on
having enrolled in college). To that aim, we use simulated counterfactuals from our
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model to construct the treatment effect parameters defined in Section 2.4.6. More
precisely, we compute the gains of attending a private-voucher school, Y1 − Y0, for
each of our simulated individuals, and then compute averages that correspond to
the definition of the treatment effects.
Table 2.12 reports the estimated treatment effects. It displays estimates for the
average treatment effect (ATE), the average treatment effect on the treated (TT),
and the average treatment effect on the untreated (TUT). The statistical significance
of the treatment effects is tested by using a t-test in means. The estimated effects
on test scores are all significant, and are all but one positive. On average, attending
a voucher school increases verbal scores by 0.07σ. This effect is somewhat smaller
for the subsample of students actually attending voucher high schools, or treated
individuals (0.06σ), and larger for students attending public schools, or untreated
individuals (0.08σ). The effect sizes are in the mid-range of the existing evidence,
and are higher than many of the voucher effects reported in the literature (Epple et
al., 2017). The effects found for math are somewhat smaller. The average treatment
effect is 0.01σ. Moreover, students actually deciding to attend voucher high schools
see their math scores slightly decrease by 0.004σ. On the contrary, the voucher
effect is positive and significant for students that attend public high schools. The
estimated TUT effect is 0.02σ. These estimated effects lie in the mid- to low-range
in the existing literature.
Table 2.12 also reports the estimated effects on the outcomes related to higher
education, namely college enrollment and graduation. Attending a voucher high
school increases the likelihood of enrolling in college by 1.9 percentage points (p.p.)
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on average. In contrast to what we observe for the effects on test scores, it is
the subsample of treated students (i.e. that attend a voucher high school) that
present the highest effects. The corresponding TT effect is 2.3 p.p., and the TUT
effect is 1.6 p.p. Recall from Table 2.1 that the average college enrollment rate
in the actual sample is 57%. When compared to the existing small literature that
looks at the effects of vouchers on college enrollment, our estimates are in line
with what is found elsewhere (Chingos and Peterson, 2015; Chingos, 2018). An
interesting result is found for the outcome of college graduation (conditional on
having enrolled in college). On average, attending a voucher high school reduces
the chances of graduating from college by 1.6 p.p. However, the estimated effect
is highly heterogeneous among students. For students actually attending a voucher
high school (treated group), the effect is positive and of about 1.2 p.p. For students
actually attending a public high school (untreated group), the effect is negative and
of about −3.3 p.p. An immediate question that arises is, what is driving these
disparities? Our model as it is does not provide an exact explanation of the actual
mechanisms, but it does allow us to shed some light on the underlying factors. We
conjecture that the large and positive effects of vouchers on test scores forcefully
allow students not only to attend college with a higher probability, but also to attend
“better” higher education institutions (e.g. higher-quality, more prestigious, more
professional than vocational).24 But “better” institutions are also presumably more
difficult to graduate from (e.g. stricter grading and passing rules, more competition
from higher-ability peers). Thus, students attending public high schools may find it
24See Rodŕıguez et al. (2016).
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harder to complete their college degree in “better” colleges whenever they lack the
endowments and family background that are necessary to avoid dropping out (see
Table 2.7). That may not be the case of students actually attending voucher high
schools, who on average have better endowments and family background (see Table
2.5). Thus, the positive TT and negative TUT effects.
Table 2.12: Estimated Treatment Effects of Attending a Voucher High School
ATE TT TUT
college admission exams (std. dev.):
verbal 0.071∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
math 0.011∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
higher education (probability):
college enrollment 0.019∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗
college graduation -0.016∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗
Notes: This table presents the estimated treatment effects of attending a private-voucher high
school in lieu of a public high school. We compute the treatment effects by using counterfactuals
from our simulated model. The statistical significance of the treatment effects is tested by using
a t-test in means. ATE refers to the average treatment effect, or E [Y1 − Y0]. TT refers to the
average treatment effect on the treated, or E [Y1 − Y0|D = 1]. TUT refers to the average treatment
effect on the untreated, or E [Y1 − Y0|D = 0]. ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 0.05
and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Our last exercise examines the heterogeneity of the voucher effects with re-
spect to students’ ability. Specifically, we use our simulated sample to estimate the
statistical relation between the individual treatment gains, Y1− Y0, and ability. We
call this relation the effect of ability on the treatment effect. Figure 2.6 plots this
effect for all four outcomes we study. We observe a negative relation between the
treatment effect and ability for verbal scores and college enrollment (panels A and
C). That is, low-ability individuals benefit more of attending a voucher high school
than high-ability individuals. In particular, students with very low levels of abil-
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ity experience a treatment effect of about 0.09σ on verbal scores, which is almost
three times as large as the effect experienced by high-ability students. Similarly,
the treatment effect for college enrollment varies from about 3 p.p. for low-ability
students to about 0 p.p. for high-ability students. A different pattern is found for
math scores (panel B). Students with low levels of ability benefit less of attending
a voucher high school than students with high levels of ability. The treatment ef-
fect varies from about 0 p.p. to about 3 p.p. Lastly, the treatment effect on the
probability of graduating from college (conditional on having enrolled in college)
is estimated to be fairly constant at −0.02 p.p. for individuals with low levels of
ability, and then to be increasing in ability for individuals with high levels of ability.
This is consistent with our above-mentioned conjecture that the ability endowment
is an important factor driving positive treatment effects.
The analysis presented in Figure 2.6 is key to better understand how vouchers
affect students. They show that the treatment effects are highly heterogeneous, and
can certainly help policymakers better target the implementation of policies.
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Figure 2.6: The Effect of Ability on Treatment Effects
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Notes: This figure plots the statistical relation between the treatment effect, Y1 − Y0, and ability,
for the outcomes of verbal scores, math scores, college enrollment, and college degree attainment.
The relations are estimated nonparametrically using simulations from the model.
2.7 Conclusions
We investigate the short and longer-term effects of attending a private-voucher
high school in Chile. To that aim, we postulate a sequential model of schooling deci-
sions and educational outcomes, which we estimate using rich administrative panel
data from Chile. We find that attending a private-voucher high school increases
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performance in high-stakes college admission exams, increases the probability of
enrolling in college, and increases the probability of graduating from college (con-
ditional on having enrolled in college) for students that actually attend voucher
high schools, but decreases such probability for students that actually attend public
high schools. We explain this last result by conjecturing that attending a voucher
high school increases the likelihood of attending a higher-quality but also more aca-
demically challenging college. In such institutions, graduation strongly depends on
endowments and family background, which students in public high schools usually
lack. We also show important heterogeneity in the treatment effects, where in gen-
eral low-ability students benefit more from attending a voucher high school than
high-ability students.
Our results are novel, and show an advantage of private schools over public
schools in many educational outcomes. They also suggest that some efficiency gains
can be obtained by targeting voucher policies to low-performing and low-ability
students.
Future research should build on our results and investigate the effects that
vouchers ultimately have on labor market outcomes. Such evidence is nonexistent
to the best of our knowledge, and can certainly increase our knowledge about the
consequences of vouchers.
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Chapter 3: Targeted or Universal? Mobilizing Students Through
School Vouchers
3.1 Introduction
In the past two decades, the education literature has made significant progress
in understanding how vouchers affect the demand side of education markets (i.e.
students). We have learned, from both experience and research, that vouchers: 1)
have at most small effects on students’ test scores; 2) have positive effects on high
school graduation and college enrollment, especially for minority students; and 3)
tend to induce a nonrandom migration from the public to the private sector, where
high-income and high-ability students are the most likely to transition from public
to private schools (Epple et al., 2017). Now, what do we know about the effects
on the supply side (i.e. schools)? Unfortunately, our knowledge on this matter is
very limited.1 Moreover, understanding how schools respond to vouchers is critical,
1There is a small literature that has studied the competition effects that voucher policies have on
public schools’ performance (Hoxby, 2003; Sandström and Bergström, 2005; Hsieh and Urquiola,
2006; Figlio and Rouse, 2006; Chakrabarti, 2008; Chan and McMillan, 2009; Card et al., 2010;
Chakrabarti, 2013a,b; Figlio and Hart, 2014). The consensus is that vouchers induce some pressure
on public schools to improve (although, Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006 show that, for the case of
Chile, public schools’ performance worsened in municipalities that experienced greater private
competition). However, Epple et al. (2017) argue that in many of these studies it proves hard to
truly identify the effects of increased competition on productivity, and that competition is easily
confounded with composition and accountability effects. In another vein, Neilson (2017) studies
quality responses of schools to the introduction of a targeted voucher program in Chile, while in
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as voucher programs are greatly determined by schools’ program participation de-
cisions, as well as by their choices regarding tuition, educational inputs, etc. This
paper contributes to filling this gap in the literature by explicitly studying schools’
responses to voucher policies. It does so by combining economic theory and empir-
ical analysis of administrative data from Chile.
Chile is a particularly interesting scenario to study educational vouchers. It
has more than thirty years of experience with a nationwide voucher agenda, in which
students choose among public and private schools facing no residential restrictions,
and schools (either fully or partially) fund their operations through voucher sub-
sidies that they receive from the government. In addition, the system combines
two different voucher designs to subsidize enrollment: a universal voucher, which
is a per-student subsidy paid to all schools; and a targeted voucher, which is a
per-disadvantaged student subsidy paid to schools that choose to participate in the
targeted voucher program. Thus, the Chilean case represents a one-of-a-kind imple-
mentation of a large scale voucher program, that allows the study of policies that
differentially affect the universal and targeted voucher subsidies.
This paper develops an equilibrium model of school choice and competition
under a voucher regime, which I solve using a new concept of equilibrium, and es-
timate using detailed and novel administrative data for elementary students and
schools in Chile. In the demand side of the model, families choose schools by taking
into account a number of schools’ characteristics, such as proximity, after-voucher
Sánchez (2018a) I focus on educational inputs and other strategic responses by schools to the same
targeted voucher policy.
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tuition, whether the school is public or private, religious affiliation, and other ob-
servable and unobservable characteristics. In the supply side, schools are vertically
and horizontally differentiated, and compete as in an oligopoly. Private schools si-
multaneously decide whether they participate in a targeted voucher program, and
choose the tuition they charge to students. The inherent characteristics of urban
education markets, where a large number of schools compete for attracting students,
coupled with the fact that I explicitly model demand, makes solving the supply side
game particularly challenging.2 The difficulty arises in that, depending on the size
of the market, schools’ program participation decisions may lead to a very large
number of different possible market configurations, each of which has (at least) an
equilibrium set of tuitions associated to it.3 For instance, a market with ten schools
has 1,024 different possible market configurations. A market with twenty schools has
1,048,576 different possible market configurations. Considering that Chilean educa-
tional markets are typically comprised by tens, and sometimes hundreds, of schools,
the task of solving for an equilibrium quickly becomes computationally intractable.
To overcome such difficulties, I adapt the concept of oblivious equilibrium, that
was initially introduced by Weintraub et al. (2008) to facilitate the computation
of dynamic games of imperfect competition in industries with many firms. In my
setting, oblivious equilibrium assumes that each school makes decisions based only
2Since demand is modeled explicitly, schools’ payoffs are nonlinear functions of schools’ program
participation decisions. This adds an extra layer of difficulty and tractability, relative to models
where discrete choices in supply enter linearly in firms’s payoffs (see, for example, Bresnahan and
Reiss, 1991, Berry, 1992, Seim, 2006, Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009, Sweeting, 2009).
3A market configuration in this context is a realization of schools’ program participation
decisions. For instance, for a market with two schools, let τ1 ∈ {0, 1} and τ2 ∈ {0, 1} be
school 1’s and school 2’s participation decisions, respectively. Then, the market configuration
T = {τ1, τ2} = {1, 0} is different from the market configuration T ′ = {0, 1}.
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on its own type (i.e. realization of its cost structure) and a belief of the expected
equilibrium in the market. I further define a sufficient statistic that summarizes the
market’s expected equilibrium, and that schools use to base their decisions on. This
assumption considerably reduces the computational burden, while still allowing the
model to accurately predict the choices and outcomes observed in the data.
I estimate the model using detailed and novel administrative data for elemen-
tary students and schools in Chile. I use the model and its estimated parameters
to study the economic consequences of a variety of counterfactual policy scenarios.
I perform two series of counterfactual exercises. First, I study schools’ program
participation response to different targeted voucher amounts, that range from 30%
to 200% the actual subsidy amount. Second, I study the consequences on schools’
and students’ choices of a 20% increase in government spending in vouchers, that
is entirely allocated to either increasing the universal voucher or increasing the tar-
geted voucher. Both counterfactual exercises are motivated by actual policy changes
that are currently under implementation, and that increase government spending in
vouchers by approximately 20%.
From the first counterfactual exercise, I find that a higher targeted voucher
attracts more schools to join the targeted voucher program. More important, such
response is heterogeneous with respect to schools’ quality. The first schools that
decide to join the program are low-quality schools, while high quality schools join
only if the subsidy is sufficiently high. These results speaks directly to the evidence
shown in Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2018), and highlight the importance of understand-
ing schools’ responses to voucher policies. Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2018) present
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striking evidence that a recently introduced targeted voucher program, the Louisiana
Scholarship Program, lowers students’ math scores by 0.4 standard deviations, and
also lowers achievement in three other subjects. When trying to explain why these
negative achievement impacts emerge, the authors show evidence suggesting that
selection of low-quality schools into the program may greatly explain the results.
From the second counterfactual exercise, I find that allocating all the extra
funds into increasing the universal voucher induces some schools to leave the tar-
geted program. Moreover, these leaving schools tend to be of higher quality than
the typical school that stays in the program. The increase in the universal voucher
also makes schools respond by lowering tuition. I find that a $1 rise in the universal
voucher translates into a $0.58 fall in average tuition. On the contrary, allocating all
the extra funds into the targeted voucher induces more schools to join the targeted
program. Once again, the marginal schools (i.e. those that change their partic-
ipation decision following a policy change) are of higher quality than the typical
school that participates in the program before and after the policy change. The
price response of schools is not as steep as in the increase-in-the-universal-voucher
scenario. In the demand side of the markets, some students respond to the poli-
cies by changing their school choices. Specifically, 7% of disadvantaged and 11% of
non-disadvantaged students switch schools when the universal voucher is increased.4
Likewise, 4% of disadvantaged and 2% of non-disadvantaged students switch schools
when the targeted voucher is increased. In both cases, most of the switching stu-
4Disadvantaged (non-disadvantaged) students are students that are (not) eligible to receive the
targeted voucher. A student is classified by the Ministry of Education as being disadvantaged
according to an income-based index, that was initially set to capture approximately the poorest
40% of the population. In practice, 52% of the student population is classified as disadvantaged.
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dents switch to a school of higher quality. Lastly, the rise in a measure of students’
welfare is higher in the aggregate when the universal voucher is increased than when
the targeted voucher is increased. However, the welfare gap between disadvantaged
and non-disadvantaged students increases under the universal voucher policy, and
it shrinks under the targeted voucher policy.
This paper contributes to the literature along several fronts. First, I move be-
yond analyzing the question of whether an education system with school vouchers is
superior to a system without vouchers, but rather focus on studying the economic
implications of specific voucher designs and policies. Though the former question is
of great importance, and has attracted the attention of many studies (Rouse, 1998;
McEwan and Carnoy, 2000; Angrist et al., 2002, 2006; Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006;
Rouse and Barrow, 2009; Bravo et al., 2010), I choose to investigate a narrower, but
arguably more policy relevant question. Voucher programs come in all shapes and
sizes, and their effects on outcomes directly depend on their design and the institu-
tional setting in which they are introduced. Hence the importance of understanding
the economic consequences associated to specific voucher plans. Recent studies that
analyze similar questions include Gazmuri (2015), Ferreyra and Kosenok (2017),
Neilson (2017), and Singleton (2017). To my knowledge, this is the first paper that
empirically studies the implications of both universal and targeted voucher policies.
Second, this paper also contributes to the existing literature on the indus-
trial organization of education markets. Studies such as Manski (1992), Epple and
Romano (1998, 2008), and Nechyba (1999, 2000, 2003a,b) develop theoretical and
computational general equilibrium models of education markets in which compe-
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tition between public and private schools is introduced through tuition vouchers.
These papers are motivated by early implementations of school choice programs in
the U.S., as well as by the ideas for market-based educational vouchers originally
laid out by Friedman (1962). A second and more empirical set of studies in this
literature use actual data from existing school systems to learn about the economic
implications of increased school choice.5 Along this front, this paper most closely
relates to Gazmuri (2015) and Neilson (2017), that estimate demand models of
school choice for Chile’s elementary education. Both studies use the results from
their demand models to draw conclusions on the sorting and competition effects
related to the introduction of a targeted voucher program. This paper improves
on those studies by adding the explicit modeling of schools’ decisions, which allows
me to quantify schools’ responses to voucher policies. Thus, I am able to answer a
broader set of questions than if I estimated schools’ demand in an isolated fashion.
Furthermore, I show that supply responses play an important role in determining
markets’ equilibria. This paper also relates to Ferreyra and Kosenok (2017), and
Singleton (2017), that estimate demand and supply models for charters schools in
Washington, D.C. and Florida, respectively. I advance those studies by allowing
schools to respond to policies along two dimensions: participation in the targeted
voucher program, and tuition setting. The above-mentioned studies assume that
schools respond via one channel only (i.e. entry).
Finally, this study adds to the entry and location choice literature in indus-
5See e.g. Rouse (1998), Angrist et al. (2002, 2006), Hsieh and Urquiola (2006), Ferreyra (2007),
Rouse and Barrow (2009), Bravo et al. (2010), Lara et al. (2011), Correa et al. (2014), Dinerstein
and Smith (2014), Gazmuri (2015), Barrera-Osorio et al. (2017), Bau (2017), Ferreyra and Kosenok
(2017), Neilson (2017), Singleton (2017), Walters (2017), Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2018).
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trial organization (reviewed by Berry and Reiss, 2007, and Draganska et al., 2008).
This literature typically uses reduced-form specifications for firms’ profit functions,
whereas I estimate structural models of school choice and price competition that de-
termine schools’ program participation decisions. In that respect, this paper closely
relates to Draganska et al. (2009), Sullivan (2017), and Wollmann (2017), that spec-
ify sequential two-stage games, with oligopolistic firms making discrete choices on
product assortment followed by continuous choices on prices. This paper differs from
these studies by allowing an unusual large number of players (i.e schools) making
sequential decisions in an also static discrete-continuous oligopolistic setting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Next section presents the
institutional details of the Chilean school system. Section 3.3 describes the data used
in the empirical analysis, defines the educational markets, and presents descriptive
statistics and stylized facts. Section 3.4 presents an empirical model of school choice
and school competition that approximates Chile’s elementary education market.
It also describes the identification and estimation strategy. Section 3.5 presents
the estimation results. Section 3.6 presents the policy and counterfactual analysis,
where I study the economic consequences of a series of counterfactual voucher policy
scenarios. Finally, section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 School Vouchers in Chile
Chile’s educational system operates under a nationwide school choice voucher
agenda. It combines families’ preferences with (public and private) schools competi-
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tion for attracting students. Funding comes from the government, that pays voucher
subsidies directly to the schools. Residential restrictions are nonexistent, therefore
students can attend any school that they are willing to travel to (and are able to
afford).
There exist three broad types of schools in Chile. Public schools, that are
publicly managed, receive vouchers, and are tuition-free. Private-voucher schools,
that are privately managed, receive vouchers, and are allowed to charge tuition
(i.e. copayment) on top of the voucher subsidies. Private-non-voucher schools, that
are privately managed, don’t receive vouchers, and charge relatively high levels of
tuition. In addition, private (voucher and non-voucher) schools operate under more
lenient regulations regarding teachers hiring. They follow the Labor Code, as any
other firm in the country, whereas public schools are subject to a Teacher Statute,
that makes teachers hiring and firing harder.
The government combines two different voucher designs to subsidize enroll-
ment:
• Universal voucher: per-student subsidy paid to all public and private-voucher
schools.
• Targeted voucher: per-disadvantaged student subsidy paid to public and private-
voucher schools that choose to participate in the targeted voucher program.6
Participation in the universal voucher program is mandatory for all public and
6From 1981 to 2007, the Chilean system operated under a universal voucher program only. In
2008, the government added the targeted voucher program to the universal program, in an effort
to increase the access to private schools for low-income students. Since my data covers a period
post-2007, I perform my analysis under the universal-and-targeted voucher setting.
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private-voucher schools. In contrast, participation in the targeted voucher program
is voluntary.7 Private-non-voucher schools are not eligible to participate in any
voucher program.8 Schools that decide to participate in the targeted voucher pro-
gram receive an additional subsidy per every disadvantaged student that they enroll,
that supplements the subsidy received from the universal voucher. They are also
required to charge no tuition to disadvantaged students, but they can charge any
amount to non-disadvantaged. Table 3.1 summarizes the above-mentioned voucher
regulations, distinguishing between schools’ administrative type, and by whether
they participate in the targeted voucher program. It also displays the correspond-
ing enrollment shares for 1st graders for the year 2013. Notice that the vast majority
(92%) of students attend a subsidized school, either public or private-voucher, which
highlights the wide reach of any voucher policy within the student population.
Table 3.1: Voucher Policies, by School-type (year 2013)
school-type: public private-voucher private-non-voucher
in targeted voucher program: yes yes no no
receive universal voucher 3 3 3 7
receive targeted voucher 3 3 7 7
can charge tuition 7 to non-disadv. 3 3
enrollment (%) 40 35 17 8
Notes: This table summarizes the regulations that apply to schools, depending on whether the
school is public, private-voucher, or private-non-voucher, and on whether it participates in the
targeted voucher program. Enrollment shares correspond to 1st grade for the year 2013.
7While, in principle, public schools have the choice to participate in the targeted voucher
program, in practice, virtually all of them opt in. On the other hand, there is a considerable
number of private-voucher schools that decide not to participate in the program.
8It is important to note that, despite the fact that private schools are allowed to switch their
voucher status (e.g. from private-voucher to private-non-voucher, and viceversa) from one year to
another, such transitions are very rare.
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3.3 Data, Educational Markets, and Descriptive Statistics
3.3.1 Data
I combine various administrative data sets for Chilean students and schools
for the year 2013. First, I use the registry of all operating schools, in which I observe
schools’ management type, tuition, decision to participate in the targeted voucher
program, address, and other characteristics such as religious orientation and urban
status. Second, I use the registry of all students attending elementary education
in the country. In these data I observe students’ grade and school of attendance,
whether the student is disadvantaged or non-disadvantaged, residential address,
and other characteristics such as gender and date of birth.9 Third, I use records
on students’ performance in mandatory national standardized tests taken by all 4th
graders in the country. Finally, I use responses to a questionnaire sent to parents
and tutors during the days 4th grade students take the national standardized tests.
These responses provide additional demographic characteristics for students, such as
parents’ level of education, household income, and house amenities (e.g. computer
and internet availability). Appendix A provides a more detailed description of the
administrative data sets I use in this paper.
I use the address information contained in the administrative data to calculate
students’ geographical proximity to schools. The Ministry of Education already
provides geocoded addresses in the form of latitude and longitude coordinates for
9Students’ addresses represent confidential data that I obtained from the Ministry of Education
after signing a non-disclosure agreement. I store and analyze these records in a secure machine.
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all schools in the country. It does not, however, provide coordinates for students’
residential addresses. I then use a combination of GIS tools to obtain geographic
coordinates from these data. This process is key in order to specify a sensitive
demand and supply model, because, as I show below, geographical proximity is a
strong determinant of school choice and competition.
Finally, I collect data on private-non-voucher schools’ tuition. Such infor-
mation is not included in the administrative data that the Ministry of Education
provides. I perform this process by manually collecting tuition amounts from either
schools’ websites or telephone conversations. I successfully retrieve tuition values
for all private-non-voucher schools in the country.
3.3.2 Educational Markets
In this setting, there is no clear definition of geographic educational markets,
because students face no geographical constraints when choosing schools, and there
is no administrative boundaries that define and separate the markets. Gazmuri
(2015) and Neilson (2017) face the same empirical challenge, and they both provide
reasonable guides to define and form geographic educational markets for Chile. I
follow their approaches, and use data on students’ travelled distance to define the
markets. Specifically, I join all contiguous municipalities where 5% or more of the
students attending schools in those municipalities reside in.10 This creates a network
of municipalities that constitutes a market. Finally, and in an effort to select only
10Following Neilson (2017), I assume that two municipalities are contiguous if and only they are
5 km. or less apart from each other, when measured by their two closest points.
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predominantly urban markets, I drop all markets with less than 10,000 elementary
education students. I end up with 29 non-overlapping markets across the country.
However, in this version of the paper, I use data from 28 of the 29 markets. For
computational reasons, I leave out the market corresponding to the capital city,
Santiago.
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for the the 28 educational markets used
in the empirical analysis. Three important markets’ characteristics are worth men-
tioning. First, the educational markets in the sample are large, with an average of
23,651 students and 86 schools. The smallest market is comprised by 35 schools,
whereas the largest market has 240 schools competing for attracting students. Sec-
ond, 52% of the students in the average market are disadvantaged. And this number
ranges from 30% to 69% in the entire sample, which highlights the broad impact
that any policy change in the targeted voucher can have on students’ school choices.
Third, on average markets have 42 private-voucher schools competing with each
other, and this number goes up to 138 in the largest market. Again, this markets’
feature underscores the importance of any policy change in the voucher subisidies.
On the other hand, a large number of private-voucher schools in a market represents
an empirical challenge when trying to model and estimate schools’ behavior in an
oligopolistic context, as I show in section 3.4.
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Table 3.2: Educational Markets’ Characterization
mean std. dev. min max
no. of students 23,651 13,810 10,082 59,316
% disadvantaged students 52 10 30 69
no. of schools 86 52 35 240
no. of public schools 38 19 14 87
no. of private-voucher schools 42 33 12 138
no. of private-non-voucher schools 6 7 0 35
% private-voucher schools in targeted program 62 17 21 86
Notes: Summary statistics for all 28 geographic educational markets included in the empirical
analysis. The data from the market corresponding to the capital city, Santiago, is not included.
Figures 3.1-3.4 present an example of an educational market created with the
geocoded data. The market is formed by the municipalities of Coquimbo and La
Serena, in Northern Chile. Figure 3.1 displays the streets and roads layout for the
market. Figure 3.2 displays the spatial distribution of students’ homes within the
market. It distinguishes between disadvantaged (in purple) and non-disadvantaged
(in yellow) students. Notice that it is possible to identify neighborhoods with high
and low concentrations of disadvantaged students. Figure 3.3 displays the spatial
distribution of schools within the market, distinguishing between public (in yel-
low), private-voucher (in blue), and private-non-voucher (in red) schools. Here, we
can also identify areas with different concentrations of privately managed schools.
Finally, Figure 3.4 displays the spatial distribution of private-voucher schools, dis-
tinguishing between schools that do (in blue) and do not (in light blue) participate
in the targeted voucher program. Not surprisingly, neighborhoods with high concen-
trations of disadvantaged students (in Figure 3.2) also present high concentrations
of schools that opted to participate in the targeted voucher program. Nonetheless,
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both types of schools are found in all of the neighborhoods.
Figure 3.1: Educational Market: Coquimbo-La Serena
Notes: This figure shows the streets and roads layout for the educational market formed by the
municipalities of Coquimbo and La Serena, in Northern Chile.
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Figure 3.2: Educational Market: Coquimbo-La Serena - Students
Notes: This figure shows the spatial distribution of students in the educational market formed
by the municipalities of Coquimbo and La Serena, in Northern Chile. It distinguishes between
disadvantaged (in purple) and non-disadvantaged (in yellow) students.
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Figure 3.3: Educational Market: Coquimbo-La Serena - Schools
Notes: This figure shows the spatial distribution of schools in the educational market formed by
the municipalities of Coquimbo and La Serena, in Northern Chile. It distinguishes between public
(in yellow), private-voucher (in blue), and private-non-voucher (in red) schools.
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Figure 3.4: Educational Market: Coquimbo-La Serena - Private-voucher Schools
Notes: This figure shows the spatial distribution of schools in the educational market formed by
the municipalities of Coquimbo and La Serena, in Northern Chile. It distinguishes between schools
that participate (in blue) and do not participate (in light blue) in the targeted voucher program.
3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1 displays the size of the annual voucher subsidies for the years 2008–
2014. Figure 4.1 complements this analysis graphically. We observe that both the
universal voucher and the targeted voucher have been slowly and steadily increasing
over the years, with averages for the period of $1,114 and $604 for the universal and
targeted vouchers, respectively. The targeted voucher amount is considerable, rela-
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tive to the universal voucher, representing about 50%–60% the size of the universal
voucher.
Table 3.3: Size of Annual Voucher Subsidies, by Category and Year








Notes: Voucher levels are in real prices using 2013 as the base year, and were transformed from
Ch$ to US$ according to the exchange rate as of March 1, 2013 (472.96 Ch$/US$). The universal
voucher values correspond to those for students at schools with full school shifts.
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Notes: Voucher levels are in real prices using 2013 as the base year, and were transformed from
Ch$ to US$ according to the exchange rate as of March 1, 2013 (472.96 Ch$/US$). The universal
voucher values correspond to those for students at schools with full school shifts.
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Figure 3.6 displays the enrollment share distribution for first graders among
the three broad types of schools for the years 2008–2014. Three important patterns
emerge. First, public and private-voucher schools together enroll more than 90% of
students. Second, the share of students in public schools has been slightly decreas-
ing over time, going from a little more than 40% in 2008 to somewhat less than 40%
in 2014. Third, such decline in public schools enrollment has translated in an al-
most one-to-one increase in the share of students attending private-voucher schools,
while the private-non-voucher enrollment share has remained fairly constant over
the period.

















Notes: Calculated using administrative data from the Ministry of Education.
Table 3.4 summarizes the characteristics of elementary schools, distinguishing
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by whether the school is public, private-voucher, or private-non-voucher, and by
whether the school participates in the targeted voucher program. Consistent with
Figure 3.6, 92% of students attend subsidized schools, either public (40%) or private-
voucher (52%).11 Also, schools that participate in the targeted voucher program
enroll about three quarters of the student population. When we disaggregate the
student population into disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged groups, we observe
that 90% of disadvantaged students attend schools that participate in the targeted
voucher program (52% public, 38% private-voucher), which means that they force-
fully pay zero tuition. For non-disadvantaged students, the enrollment distribution
is somewhat different, with almost three quarters of students attending privately
managed schools (57% private-voucher, 16% private-non-voucher). A fifth of public
schools are located in rural areas, while less than 7% of private-voucher and none of
private-non-voucher schools are considered to be rural. Public schools are mandated
to be tuition-free. Private-voucher schools that participate in the targeted voucher
program must charge zero tuition to disadvantaged students, and charge on average
$121 per year to non-disadvantaged. Private-voucher schools that do not partici-
pate in the targeted voucher program charge on average $711 for annual tuition.
Private-non-voucher schools charge much higher tuition than the rest of schools,
with an average of almost $5,000 per year. The performance in standardized math
tests of students in public schools is the lowest among the groups of schools. Stu-
dents in private-voucher schools that participate in the targeted voucher program
come in second. Students in private-voucher schools not participating in the tar-
11These numbers correspond to first grade enrollment in 2013.
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geted voucher program outperform students in the former two groups of schools,
and students in private-non-voucher schools obtain the highest scores. The same
order is observed for the percentage of teachers with some kind of specialization,
and the percentage of teachers with long-term work contracts, with public schools
having the lowest concentrations, and private-non-voucher schools the highest ones.
Table 3.4: Schools’ Characteristics, by School-type
school-type: public private-voucher private-non-voucher
in targeted voucher program: yes yes no no
enrollment (%) 40 35 17 8
enrollment - disadv. (%) 52 38 10 1
enrollment - non-disadv. (%) 27 31 26 16
rural (%) 21 7 1 0
avg. annual tuition (US$) 0 0/121 711 4,960
avg. math scores -0.25 -0.01 0.28 0.75
teachers with specialization (%) 41 46 55 57
teachers with long-term contracts (%) 44 59 64 81
Notes: This table summarizes the characteristics of elementary schools, depending on whether
the school is public, private-voucher, or private-non-voucher, and on whether it participates in
the targeted voucher program. Tuition levels are in real prices using 2013 as the base year, and
were transformed from Ch$ to US$ according to the exchange rate as of March 1, 2013 (472.96
Ch$/US$). Test scores are standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one at the
student level. Enrollment shares correspond to 1st grade for the year 2013.
Figure 3.7 presents a more detailed picture of the heterogeneity in the tuition
charged by private-voucher schools. It plots the distribution of annual full tuition
charged by private-voucher schools, depending on whether the school participates
in the targeted voucher program.12 The tuition distribution for private-voucher
schools participating in the targeted voucher program is highly right-skewed, with
almost 70% of schools charging zero tuition (to non-disadvantaged students), and
virtually no schools charging more than $500. In contrast, the tuition distribution
12Full tuition refers to the tuition paid by non-disadvantaged students.
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for private-voucher schools not participating in the targeted voucher program is
much more disperse. Only about 20% of schools don’t charge tuition, and there is
a high proportion of schools charging relatively high amounts.
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Notes: Full tuition refers to the tuition paid by non-disadvantaged students. Tuition levels are in
real prices using 2013 as the base year, and were transformed from Ch$ to US$ according to the
exchange rate as of March 1, 2013 (472.96 Ch$/US$).
Figure 3.8 presents the distribution of private-voucher schools’ average test
scores in the 4th grade mathematics standardized exam, disaggregated by whether
schools participate in the targeted voucher program or not. We observe three impor-
tant patterns. First, there is high heterogeneity in average test scores among schools.
This is true for the group of schools that participate in the targeted voucher pro-
gram, as well as for the group of schools that opted out. Second, the distribution for
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schools that don’t participate in the targeted voucher program is more left-skewed
than the distribution for schools participating in the program, which translates into
a higher proportion of schools with high test scores in the former group. Finally,
there is a good amount of overlapping between the two distributions, suggesting
that, even though, on average, students in schools not participating in the targeted
voucher program achieve higher test scores than students in the other group of
schools, this is not necessarily the case on a school-by-school basis.
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Notes: School’s average test score is the average score in the mathematics standardized test for
4th grade students enrolled in the school. Test scores are standardized to have mean zero and
standard deviation one at the student level.
82
3.4 A Demand and Supply Model of Elementary Schools
I develop and estimate a structural model of demand and supply of schools
for Chile’s elementary education. There exist several education markets that are
geographically separated one from another. Each market is populated by households
that live in different locations within the market, and that have children who are
eligible for attending elementary school. Given its budget constraint, each household
chooses among the schools available in the market.
There are three different types of schools: public, private-voucher, and private-
non-voucher. In each market, schools are located in different geographic areas within
the market. Location decisions are assumed to be exogenous. Public schools are
mandated to be tuition free, private-voucher schools are allowed to charge tuition,
and private-non-voucher schools charge relatively high levels of tuition. Public and
private-voucher schools receive a flat per-student subsidy voucher (i.e. universal
voucher). In addition, a complementary subsidy program is available for public
and private-voucher schools: a targeted voucher to disadvantaged students. This
targeted program is mandatory for public schools, and is optional for private-voucher
schools. The targeted voucher program adds extra per-pupil funds of about 50%
over the universal voucher for every disadvantaged student that the school enrolls,
with the requirement of charging zero tuition to those students. Thus, each private-
voucher school that chooses to participate in the targeted voucher program must
charge zero tuition to disadvantaged students, but can charge any amount to non-
disadvantaged. In contrast, private-voucher schools that opt out charge a unique
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level of tuition to all students, regardless of whether the student is disadvantaged
or non-disadvantaged. Private-non-voucher schools do not receive any subsidy.
3.4.1 Demand
I assume that students have heterogeneous preferences over schools’ tuition,
geographical proximity (i.e. distance from home to school), a set of schools’ fixed
characteristics, such as whether the school is public or private, its religious orienta-
tion, etc., and a measure of schools’ quality. I capture heterogeneity in preferences
with a set of random coefficients that vary over students’ observed demographic
characteristics. Formally, in each market, student i ∈ {1, . . . , I} chooses the school














j + εij (3.1)
where pζj is school j’s tuition charged to student i, dij is distance from student i’s
home to school j, Xj is a vector of school j’s characteristics, qj is school j’s quality,
and εij is an i.i.d. preference shock. The superscript ζ refers to the type of the stu-







we have βζ = Diβ
D + (1 − Di)βnonD, where Di = 1[i is disadvantaged]. Sim-
ilarly, βζ1i = Diβ
D







13My model’s demand specification follows the standard assumptions in the education literature,
and in particular those in Gallego and Hernando (2009), Gazmuri (2015), Arcidiacono et al. (2016),






1r , with zir a demographic characteristic.
Note that the tuition that school j charges to student i, pζj , depends on whether
the student is disadvantaged, and on whether the school participates in the targeted
voucher program. Specifically,
pζj = (1−Diτj)pj,
where τj = 1[j participates in targeted program], and pj is school j’s full tuition
level.












j . Then, Uij = Vij+εij. Assuming εij ∼







Public, private-voucher, and private-non-voucher schools are differentially af-
fected by the institutional aspects of the voucher subsidies. I am interested in the
effect that voucher policies have on schools’ decisions to participate in the targeted
voucher program, and on their tuition levels. Therefore, I focus only on private-
voucher schools’ decisions, given that all public schools participate in the targeted
voucher program and are not allowed to charge tuition, and private-non-voucher
schools are not directly affected by the vouchers.
I assume that private-voucher schools make decisions on whether to participate
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in the targeted voucher program, and on their tuition level, given their expectations
of other schools’ decisions, demand, and the realization of a cost structure, that
consists of a marginal cost of educating a student and a fixed cost of participating
in the targeted voucher program. I further assume that private-voucher schools are
profit seekers, a reasonable assumption for the context, and common in the literature
(Urquiola and Verhoogen, 2009; Barrera-Osorio et al., 2017; Neilson, 2017).
More formally, school j incurs in a marginal cost of cj for delivering education
to a student, which may vary depending on whether the student is disadvantaged or
non-disadvantaged.14 This marginal cost includes extra spending in teaching hours,
staff remuneration, utilities’ bills, etc., that are associated to the education of an
additional student. I assume that schools observe each other’s marginal costs when
they make their choices, i.e. marginal costs are public information. In addition,
school j incurs in a fixed cost of κj for participating in the targeted voucher program.
This fixed cost includes administrative efforts related to dealing with an additional
source of subsidy (i.e. bureaucracy), perceived costs associated to increased mon-
itoring by the government, as well as school’s own preference for serving (or not)
disadvantaged students. Further, I assume that the fixed cost is observed only by
the school itself, but not by its competitors, i.e. it is private information. In contrast
to marginal costs, which are primarily driven by observable costs for homogeneous
inputs, fixed costs may depend on the intrinsic efficiency of each school’s processes,
the strategic decisions it makes, as well as its own preference for participating in the
14It is reasonable to believe that educating a disadvantaged student, that is highly likely to
come from a vulnerable and at-risk family, may involve more educational efforts than educating a
non-disadvantaged student, who presumably enjoys of a richer and more stimulating environment
at home.
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program, all of which are generally unobserved to the other schools.
Thus, private-voucher school j chooses its program participation and tuition
level to maximize expected profits:
max
τj∈{0,1},pj≥0
E [Πj] = Eτ−j
[
(pj + v














where τj is school j’s decision to join the targeted voucher program, and v
u and vt
are the universal and targeted voucher subsidies, respectively. To simplify notation,
I suppress (p1, . . . , pJ ; τ1 . . . , τJ) as arguments of Pij. Note, too, that the expectation
is taken with respect to the other schools’ program participation decisions, τ−j.
The expression for school j’s expected profits consists of three parts. The first
part is the profits obtained for educating non-disadvantaged students, where for
each of those students the school perceives the tuition they charge, pj, the universal
voucher, vu, and incurs in a marginal cost cnonDj . The second part is the profits
obtained for educating disadvantaged students in the case that the school joins the
targeted program, where for each disadvantaged student the school perceives the
universal and targeted vouchers, vu + vt, and incurs in a marginal cost cDj . Notice
that cDj is generally different from c
nonD
j . The school also pays the fixed cost τj for
participating in the targeted program. Finally, the third part is the profits obtained
for educating disadvantaged students in the case that the school opts out of the
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targeted program, where for each disadvantaged student the school perceives the
tuition it charges, pj, the universal voucher, v
u, and incurs in a marginal cost cDj .
Implicit in my description of schools’ objective function is the fact that schools
do not present different marginal costs across regimes. That is, they do not become
more or less efficient in the delivery of education by joining the program. The
reason for making this assumption is that, if we assume that disadvantaged and
non-disadvantaged students involve different education costs, then different marginal
costs across regimes are not longer identifiable from the data, as I show below.
On the contrary, if we assume that disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged students
involve the same marginal costs, then different marginal costs across regimes can be
identified. I find the former interpretation more plausible for the Chilean context,
where there is a perceived higher cost of educating students from more vulnerable
backgrounds (Fontaine and Urzúa, 2018); however, I do not rule out the latter.
The solution to schools’ optimization problem is not trivial for several reasons.
First, it involves both a discrete variable and a continuous variable to maximize over.
Second, the continuous variable, pj, is constrained to be non-negative, and therefore
may result in a corner solution in the optimum. Third, the objective function
depends on other schools’ decisions through the Pij(·) terms (i.e. it is a game).
Consider the optimality conditions for pj, and ignore the expectation over
other schools’ participation decisions for a moment. If the school participates in the
targeted program (i.e. τj = 1), the Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions for tuition
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are:










= 0, and pj|τj=1(τ−j, p−j) ≥ 0,
where the first equation is the profits’ derivative with respect to tuition being less
than or equal to zero, the second equation is the complementary slackness, and
the last equation is the non-negativity constraint. Also, (τ−j, p−j) is the vector
containing all other schools’ program participation and tuition decisions. From the
first equation, we observe that the universal voucher drives down the tuition charged
by the school. In other words, the larger the universal voucher, the lower the level
of tuition set by the school, all else equal. The last term on the right-hand side
in the first equation represents the markup relative to the marginal cost and the
universal voucher that schools can charge because of their market power. This
markup is smaller the more price-sensitive the demand is. Notice that the markup
term depends only on the demand of non-disadvantaged students. This is so because
the school is required not to charge tuition to disadvantaged students in the case
the school joins the targeted voucher program. This institutional feature allows the
identification of school j’s marginal cost for educating non-disadvantaged students,
cnonDj .
15
15Strictly speaking, cnonDj is identified only for schools charging positive tuition. In the empirical
implementation of the model, I make functional assumptions that allow me to infer costs for schools
with a binding non-negativity constraint. Same rationale applies to the identification of cD&nonDj
below.
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The Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions for tuition, in the case that the school
opts out of the targeted voucher program (i.e. τj = 0) are:










= 0, and pj|τj=0(τ−j, p−j) ≥ 0.
Here, the markup term in the first equation depends on the demand of all students,
because school j’s tuition is charged to everybody, regardless of whether the student
is disadvantaged or non-disadvantaged. For this reason, I can identify school j’s
marginal cost of educating both disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged students,
cD&nonDj .
Notice that I emphasize the dependency of the optimal tuition on the program
participation decisions of all schools in the market, τ = (τ1, . . . , τJ). This implies
that there is potentially a different set of optimal tuition levels for every different
market configuration.






Πj|τj=1(τ−j, p(τ−j))− Πj|τj=0(τ−j, p(τ−j))
]
− κj > 0
}
,
which simply states that school j joins the targeted program if and only if the
expected profits of joining the program net of the program participation costs are
greater than the expected profits of not joining the program.
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As it is, this problem is theoretically solvable. However, in practice, it proves to
be computationally intractable. The main reason for this intractability comes from
the need of computing a different equilibrium set of tuitions for each possible market
configuration. And, considering that urban education markets in Chile include tens,
and sometimes hundreds of private-voucher schools, the problem quickly becomes
computationally expensive as the number of schools grows. For instance, in a market
with 10 private-voucher schools, there are 1,024 different market configurations.
In a market with 20 private-voucher schools, there are 1,048,576 different market
configurations.16
To overcome such practical difficulties, I adapt the concept of Oblivious Equi-
librium (Weintraub et al., 2008) to my setting.
3.4.2.1 Oblivious Equilibrium
Oblivious equilibrium (OE) was initially introduced by Weintraub et al. (2008)
to facilitate the computation of equilibria in dynamic games of imperfect competition
in industries with a large number of firms. It constitutes an approximation to
full-solution equilibria (i.e. Markov perfect equilibria), but it has been shown to
accurately mimic the full-solution results, with approximation errors that quickly
decay as the number of firms in the industry grows (Weintraub et al., 2008, 2010;
Xu, 2008; Qi, 2013). OE in dynamic settings assumes that firms make their decisions
by taking into account the long-run equilibrium of the game, in lieu of the period-
16More generally, in a market with J private-voucher schools, there is a total of 2J different
possible market configurations.
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by-period equilibrium. Thus, firms ignore the contemporaneous effect of their own
actions on their competitors’ actions, as well as the contemporaneous effect of their
competitors’ actions on the firms’ own actions.
I adapt the concept of OE to my setting as follows. I assume that each school
makes decisions based only on its own type (i.e. realization of its fixed cost) and a
belief of the expected equilibrium in the market. This is different from a full-solution
equilibrium, in this context a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, in that the assumption
implies that schools’ competitors actions do not directly affect schools’ own actions,
but only through the expected equilibrium’s belief, and likewise schools’ own actions
only affect their competitors’ actions through their competitors’ belief about the
expected equilibrium.
I further define a sufficient statistic that summarizes the market’s expected
equilibrium, which I assume schools use to base their decisions on. I denote this










Thus, school j’s belief of the expected equilibrium consists in the vector γj =
(γ1j, . . . , γIj).
A vital criterion for an OE is that schools’ beliefs be consistent. In other words,
when schools have consistent beliefs about the expected equilibrium, the choices they
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Vik(τk=1) + (1− uk(γ̄)) eVik(τk=0)
}
, (3.2)
where γ̄ = (γ̄1, . . . , γ̄J) is the set of schools’ consistent beliefs, and uj(γ̄) = Pr(τj =
1; γ̄) is school j’s oblivious program participation probability when it has consistent
beliefs γ̄.
Equation (3.2) defines a fixed-point for γ̄, i.e. γ̄ = Γ(γ̄). I solve for this
fixed-point by using the following iterative algorithm:
1. Start with an initial value, γ̄0.
2. Compute the optimal tuition levels and profits for both the cases when the
school joins the program and when the school opts out, given the school’s
beliefs.
3. Compute the probability that the school joins the program, using the calcu-
lated profits and the realization of the fixed cost.
4. Compute a new value for the schools’ beliefs, γ̄1, following equation (3.2).
5. Compare γ̄1 with γ̄0. If γ̄1 is sufficiently close to γ̄0, stop. Otherwise, update
γ̄0 = γ̄1, and go back to step 2.
Alogirthm 1 below describes the algorithm in more detail.
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Algorithm 1 Oblivious Equilibrium Solver








tol = 1e− 6
while ∆ > tol do















j )− Πj|τj=0(p∗j|τj=0, γ
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Note that uniqueness of equilibrium in this game is not guaranteed. However,
I investigate the prevalence of multiple equilibria numerically, by computing the
number of oblivious equilibria that arise from a large grid of starting values for γ̄.
At the estimated parameters, I find that there is always a unique equilibrium.
With all this in hand, I define an Oblivious Equilibrium for this static game
as a set of oblivious participation probabilities, (u1(γ̄), . . . , uJ(γ̄)), and tuitions,
(p1(γ̄), . . . , pJ(γ̄)), such that schools’ profits are maximal given their beliefs about
the expected equilibrium, and that schools’ beliefs are consistent.17
3.4.3 Estimation and Identification
I estimate the model’s parameters sequentially. First, I obtain the demand
parameters. Then, given the demand parameters, I estimate the parameters that
enter the marginal cost and the fixed cost of participating in the targeted voucher
program.
17Notice that, despite the desirable properties of OE, this application of the concept of OE
consists in one of the very few in the literature (see, e.g., Xu, 2008; Qi, 2013).
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3.4.3.1 Demand
A key school characteristic in the demand model is school’s quality. This
variable is essentially unobservable, and is usually captured by the school fixed
effects, ξj, in standard models. However, in an effort to be able to say something
about students’ preferences for quality, I follow Arcidiacono et al. (2016), and use
test scores data to recover a proxy measure of schools’ quality (or schools’ test scores





2Xj + qj + υij, (3.3)
where yij is the test score of student i in school j, xi is a vector of student’s observed
characteristics, Xj is a vector of school’s observed characteristics, qj is school j’s
unobserved quality, and υij is an idiosyncratic error term. I proceed in two steps
for estimation. In the first step, I estimate
yij = α
′
1xi + ρj + υij.




The residual of this second step equation is my estimated measure for the unobserved
quality of the school, q̂j = ρ̂j − α̂′2Xj. I additionally use a measure of school’s
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“teachers quality”, which I define by the cross product of the subset of school’s
observed characteristics that relate to teachers (e.g. teachers’ experience, % teachers
with specialization, % female teachers, etc.) and the corresponding subset of α̂2
estimated coefficients.
With the estimated measures of schools’ quality in hand, I proceed to estimate
demand parameters following Goolsbee and Petrin (2004) and Hackmann (2015).
The estimation is done in two steps. First, I use Maximum Likelihood to estimate
distance and preference parameters capturing taste heterogeneity in mother’s edu-
cation. In the second step, I recover the remaining “average” preference parameters
by two stages least squares (2SLS).
First Step.
I use Maximum Likelihood to estimate preference for proximity, taste heterogeneity
in mother’s education level, and mean utilities, δζj . Note that mean utilities vary
at the school-student type level, and absorb the remaining preference components









































where eij is the choice indicator.
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Second Step.
I use the estimated δ̂ζj terms from the first step to estimate the remaining mean












As is usual in demand models, I assume that Xj is uncorrelated with ξj.
However, pζj is potentially endogenous. Thus, I estimate equation (3.4) by 2SLS,
using BLP-type of instruments for tuition (Berry et al., 1995).
Identification is ensured as long as the variables used to instrument for tuition
are valid instruments (i.e. are correlated with the endogenous variable, but not
with the preference shock). I follow Berry et al. (1995) and use non-price attributes
of all other schools in the market. The intuition behind these instruments is that
we believe (and according to the supply side of the model) that schools make their
program participation and tuition decisions by taking into account their competitors’
characteristics, but that the utility that a student gets from attending a given school
does not depend on the other schools’ characteristics. In practice, I use the sum of
other schools’ pupil-teacher ratio, the sum of other schools’ quality measures, and
the percentage of public schools in the market to create the instruments.18
18Results using means instead of sums for the instruments are similar to the ones I report
below. Conceptually, instruments using sums incorporate variation coming from both other schools’
characteristics and markets’ size, whereas instruments using means incorporate variation coming
only from other schools’ characteristics.
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3.4.3.2 Supply
I use the demand estimates and schools’ optimality conditions to estimate the
marginal and fixed costs parameters. I parameterize the marginal cost cj as follows:
cj = Xjω1 + εj,
where εj is an idiosyncratic shock . I can then write down the latent tuition function
to be estimated as:
p∗j = cj(ω)− vu −mj(β̂; dj) + εj,
where mj(β̂; dj) corresponds to the (estimated) markup term in the first-order con-






0 if p∗j ≤ 0.
I assume εj ∼ N(0, σ2ε ), which implies the model is a Type 1 Tobit (Tobin, 1958;
Amemiya, 1985).
Similarly, I parameterize κj = Wjλ + νj, where Wj is a vector of variables
affecting the fixed cost, and νj ∼ N(0, σ2ν). This allows me to specify a probit model
for the decision to participate in the targeted voucher program.














I estimate the costs parameters using a GMM procedure coupled with a nested
fixed-point (NFXP) algorithm that solves for markets’ equilibria at every iteration
of the parameters in the optimization routine. The moments I use are the difference
between schools’ predicted and actual program participation and tuition decisions.20
3.5 Results
I present evidence for 28 geographic markets from Chile for the year 2013,
which consists in data for 662,327 elementary school students and 2,224 schools
(959 public, 1,110 private-voucher, 155 private-non-voucher).21
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present summary statistics for the variables used in estima-
tion. Table 3.5 describes variables at the student level. On average, a student travels
3.05 km. to her school of choice. 53% of students are disadvantaged, and 51% are
male. Almost two thirds of students have a computer at home, while half of them
have internet connection. More than a quarter of students have less than 9 books
at home, while only 15% of them have more than 51 books at home. The majority
of students attended some form of preschool education. More than a quarter of stu-
dents’ mothers don’t have a secondary education degree, and only 16% of students’
mothers have a college degree. A similar pattern is observed for fathers’ education.
Finally, more than half of students live in households with a total monthly income
below $740.02, and only 7% of students live in households with a total monthly
20A proper correction for standard errors should be used to account for the fact that demand
estimates are used as inputs in the supply estimation procedure. Bootstrap is an option. The
results I show below do not include corrected standard errors.
21For the moment, I am not using data from the market that corresponds to Santiago, the
nation’s capital city.
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income of $1,902.91 or higher.
Table 3.5: Summary Statistics - Student Level
mean std. dev. median
distance to school of choice (km.) 3.05 9.49 1.39
disadvantaged 0.53 0.50 1.00
male 0.51 0.50 1.00
computer at home 0.64 0.48 1.00
internet at home 0.49 0.50 0.00
no. of books at home: 0 0.03 0.17 0.00
no. of books at home: 1–9 0.25 0.43 0.00
no. of books at home: 10–50 0.39 0.49 0.00
no. of books at home: 51–100 0.10 0.30 0.00
no. of books at home: 100 or more 0.05 0.21 0.00
no. of books at home: missing 0.18 0.39 0.00
attended day care 0.13 0.34 0.00
attended pre-kindergarten level 1 0.53 0.50 1.00
attended pre-kindergarten level 2 0.73 0.44 1.00
attended kindergarten 0.82 0.39 1.00
mother’s education: none 0.08 0.26 0.00
mother’s education: primary 0.20 0.40 0.00
mother’s education: secondary 0.39 0.49 0.00
mother’s education: college 0.16 0.36 0.00
mother’s education: missing 0.18 0.38 0.00
father’s education: none 0.07 0.26 0.00
father’s education: primary 0.20 0.40 0.00
father’s education: secondary 0.36 0.48 0.00
father’s education: college 0.15 0.35 0.00
father’s education: missing 0.22 0.41 0.00
household’s monthly income: $317.15 or less 0.23 0.42 0.00
household’s monthly income: $317.15–$740.02 0.31 0.46 0.00
household’s monthly income: $740.02–$1,902.91 0.22 0.41 0.00
household’s monthly income: $1,902.91 or more 0.07 0.25 0.00
household’s monthly income: missing 0.18 0.38 0.00
Notes: All variables are at the student level, for the sample used in estimation. Income levels are
in real prices using 2013 as the base year, and were transformed from Ch$ to US$ according to the
exchange rate as of March 1, 2013 (472.96 Ch$/US$).
Table 3.6 presents summary statistics for variables at the elementary school
level. On average, private (voucher and non-voucher) schools charge $943.15 per
year. Two thirds of private-voucher schools participate in the targeted voucher
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program. 43% of schools are public, half of schools are private-voucher, and only
7% of schools are private-non-voucher. Also, a fifth of schools are located in a rural
area, and half of schools are considered to follow a secular orientation. The average
years of experience of teachers in schools is, on average, 12.69 years. Schools tend
to hire teachers with both a degree in education and a college degree. Teachers with
specialization or with a 10 or more semesters degree are relatively scarce in schools.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Tables 3.7 and 3.8 present the results of estimating the test scores equation
(3.3). Table 3.7 shows the estimated coefficients for the first step, in which the
student level test scores are regressed on a set of student characteristics and school
fixed-effects.22 The results are in line with the existing related evidence (see, for
example, Neilson, 2017, and Rau et al., 2018). In particular, male students perform
worse than females.23 Disadvantaged students score lower than non-disadvantaged.
More resources at home (e.g. computer, internet, books) generally increases stu-
dents’ test scores. Surprisingly, attending preschool lowers students’ test scores.
The higher the level of parents’ education, the higher the test score of the student.
Similarly, more financial resources in the household increase students’ academic per-
formance.
22The test score variable used as dependent variable in this regression corresponds to the average
of student’s math and verbal scores. As I mentioned above, this variable is normalized to have
mean zero and standard deviation one.
23Rau et al. (2018) show that the gender effect varies depending on the subject tested. More
precisely, 8th grade Chilean females outperform males in verbal, but the opposite occurs in math,
social sciences, and natural sciences. They also show that the female effect in verbal is significantly
stronger than the male effect in any of the other three subjects, which may explain the negative
effects for males that Neilson (2017) and this paper find when averaging math and verbal scores.
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Table 3.7: Test Scores Regressions - Step 1
variable coef. std. err.
male -0.057∗∗∗ 0.005
disadvantaged -0.053∗∗∗ 0.005
computer at home 0.024∗∗∗ 0.008
computer at home: missing -0.052∗∗∗ 0.017
internet at home -0.006 0.007
internet at home: missing -0.076∗∗∗ 0.011
no. books at home: 0 0.044∗∗∗ 0.014
no. books at home: 10–50 0.111∗∗∗ 0.014
no. books at home: 51–100 0.180∗∗∗ 0.016
no. books at home: more than 100 0.253∗∗∗ 0.017
no. books at home: missing 0.160∗∗∗ 0.027
attended day care -0.018∗∗∗ 0.007
attended day care: missing -0.007 0.023
attended prekindergarten level 1 -0.049∗∗∗ 0.005
attended prekindergarten level 1: missing -0.107∗∗∗ 0.026
attended prekindergarten level 2 0.002 0.008
attended prekindergarten level 2: missing -0.017 0.031
attended kindergarten 0.047∗ 0.026
attended kindergarten: missing 0.047 0.043
mother’s education: primary 0.029∗∗∗ 0.010
mother’s education: secondary 0.129∗∗∗ 0.010
mother’s education: college 0.151∗∗∗ 0.012
father’s education: missing 0.040∗ 0.021
father’s education: primary 0.039∗∗∗ 0.010
father’s education: secondary 0.098∗∗∗ 0.010
father’s education: college 0.145∗∗∗ 0.012
father’s education: missing 0.091∗∗∗ 0.014
household’s monthly income: $317–$740 0.025∗∗∗ 0.007
household’s monthly income: $740–$1,903 0.051∗∗∗ 0.008
household’s monthly income: $1,903 or more 0.082∗∗∗ 0.012
household’s monthly income: missing 0.097∗∗∗ 0.023
constant -0.305∗∗∗ 0.030
R-squared 0.272
Notes: Estimated coefficients from test scores regressions at the student level. School fixed-effects
are included. ∗ denotes significance at the 90% level, ∗∗ denotes significance at the 95% level, ∗∗∗
denotes significance at the 99% level.
Table 3.8 shows the results for the second step of the estimation procedure of
the test scores equation (3.3), which uses the school fixed-effects estimated in the
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first step, and regresses them on a set of schools’ observed characteristics. Public and
private-voucher schools are associated with a low contribution to test scores, relative
to private-non-voucher schools. The coefficients for rural and secular are positive
and negative, respectively, but they are both statistically insignificant. Finally, the
results for the set of variables that relate to schools’ teacher resources suggest that
having a staff of teachers that are more qualified, have better work contracts, and
are majority female, increases schools’ contribution to test scores.
Table 3.8: Test Scores Regressions - Step 2





average teachers’ experience -0.003∗ 0.002
% teachers with a degree not in education -0.264∗ 0.145
% teachers with a college degree 0.218∗∗∗ 0.076
% teachers with a long-term contract 0.338∗∗∗ 0.041
% teachers with specialization 0.192∗∗∗ 0.041
% teachers with a 10+ semesters degree 0.182∗∗∗ 0.029
% female teachers 0.253∗∗∗ 0.049
constant -0.430∗∗∗ 0.107
R-squared 0.245
Notes: Estimated coefficients from second step of test scores regressions (at the school level).
Market fixed-effects are included. ∗ denotes significance at the 90% level, ∗∗ denotes significance
at the 95% level, ∗∗∗ denotes significance at the 99% level.
Following the analysis from section 3.4.3.1, I use the estimates from the test
scores regressions to construct a measure of schools’ unobserved quality. In addition,
I construct a measure of schools’ teachers quality, which is simply the cross-product
of schools’ teacher resources and the corresponding estimated coefficients. Figures
3.9 and 3.10 display the distributions of the estimated schools’ unobserved and
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teacher quality, respectively. Panel A in Figure 3.9 presents schools’ unobserved
quality distribution by schools’ administrative type. Unsurprisingly, given the way
the unobserved quality was constructed, all school-types present the same distribu-
tion mean. This is expected, given that the unobserved quality is the residual of a
regression that has the school-types as regressors. A considerable level of hetero-
geneity is also observed. Panel B supplements this information by showing schools’
unobserved quality distribution for private-voucher schools only, distinguishing be-
tween schools that do and do not participate in the targeted voucher program. The
quality distributions differ one from another, with schools participating in the tar-
geted voucher program presenting a more right-skewed distribution than schools
that are not in the program. Figure 3.10 presents schools’ estimated teachers qual-
ity distributions. Panel A shows the distributions by schools’ administrative type.
Private-non-voucher schools present the distribution associated to the highest lev-
els of teachers quality, which is followed by private-voucher schools’ distribution,
and lastly by public schools’ distribution. Panel B presents schools’ teacher quality
distributions for private-voucher schools only, distinguishing between schools that
do and do not participate in the targeted voucher program. Consistent with what
was observed in Figure 3.9, schools that participate in the program have a teacher
quality distribution that is more right-skewed than schools that do not participate
in the program.
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Notes: This figure plots kernel density estimates for the distribution of schools’ estimated unob-
served quality.
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Notes: This figure plots kernel density estimates for the distribution of schools’ estimated teacher
quality.
Table 3.9 displays the estimated parameters for the demand model. The table
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combines estimates from the first (maximum likelihood) and second (2SLS) steps.
The omitted mother’s level of education category is “not formal education”. My
estimates are in line with the related literature (e.g. Gallego and Hernando, 2009,
Gazmuri, 2015, Cuesta et al., 2017, Neilson, 2017). The estimated “average” param-
eters for tuition, that correspond to the omitted mother’s level of education category
of “not formal education”, are negative and statistically significant. The preference
heterogeneity parameters suggest that children with highly educated mothers are
more likely to attend schools with high levels of tuition.24 Also, disadvantaged stu-
dents have in general more negative coefficients for tuition, suggesting a greater
dislike for higher prices for this group of students.25 The coefficients on the distance
variables suggest an important dislike for long travels from home to school. They
also show that preferences are convex with respect to distance. Public schools are
less preferred than private schools in both groups of students, as is the case of ru-
ral schools relative to urban schools. The opposite is observed for secular schools,
relative to religious schools. Finally, students prefer schools of higher quality, al-
though non-disadvantaged students may have stronger preferences for quality than
disadvantaged students.
24The correct reading of the tuition coefficients for each mother’s education group is obtained
by adding the “average” coefficient to the coefficient that correspond to the group of interest.
For instance, the tuition coefficient for non-disadvantaged students whose mothers have primary
education is −0.177− 0.095 = −0.272.
25Gazmuri (2015), unlike Gallego and Hernando (2009), Cuesta et al. (2017), Neilson (2017),
and this paper, finds positive coefficients in tuition for some groups of students. Her results may
be explained by the fact that she does not instrument for tuition, but rather assumes exogeneity
of that variable after controlling for other schools’ characteristics.
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Table 3.9: Estimates for Demand Model
non-disadvantaged disadvantaged
coef. std. err. coef. std. err.
annual tuition/100 -0.177 0.004 -0.055 0.007
annual tuition/100 × mother’s education: primary -0.095 0.011 -0.196 0.008
annual tuition/100 × mother’s education: secondary 0.083 0.010 -0.037 0.002
annual tuition/100 × mother’s education: college 0.138 0.010 0.003 0.002
annual tuition/100 × mother’s education: missing 0.164 0.010 -0.062 0.004
distance to school/10 -5.023 0.051 -5.267 0.048
distance to school squared/10 0.026 0.002 0.050 0.001
public -0.631 0.055 -0.073 0.071
rural -0.657 0.068 -0.988 0.124
secular 0.096 0.046 0.116 0.060
unobserved quality 0.790 0.059 0.336 0.075
teachers quality 3.529 0.285 1.544 0.331
constant -2.102 0.212 -1.025 0.235
Notes: Results from maximum likelihood estimation of distance and preference heterogeneity by
mother’s education, and from 2SLS estimation of remaining mean preference parameters. Omitted
mother’s level of education category is “not formal education”. Tuition is instrumented with non-
price attributes of other schools in the market in the 2SLS estimation. Tuition amounts are in real
prices for the year 2013, and were transformed from Ch$ to US$ according to the exchange rate
as of March 1, 2013 (472.96 Ch$/US$).
3.5.2 Supply Estimates
Table 3.10 displays the estimated marginal cost and program participation
fixed cost parameters. The results for the marginal cost parameters are the follow-
ing. Higher quality schools present higher marginal costs. This is true for both
measures of quality. More precisely, one standard deviation of higher unobserved
quality translates into $27.9 of higher marginal costs. Likewise, one standard devi-
ation of higher teachers quality increases marginal costs by $29.6. Secular schools
have on average $12.8 higher marginal costs than religious schools, although the
corresponding estimate is not statistically significant. Rural schools have on av-
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erage $169.9 lower marginal schools than schools located in urban areas. This is
an intuitive result if we believe that rural schools invest less in amenities per stu-
dent, and that staff and teachers’ wages are lower in rural areas than in the city.26
Lastly, schools that participate in the targeted program have on average $315.8 lower
marginal costs. In other words, the marginal cost of educating non-disadvantaged
students is about three hundred dollars lower than the marginal cost of educating
both disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged students.27
The results for the program participation cost parameters are the following.
Higher levels of unobserved and teachers quality are associated with higher levels of
participation cost, suggesting that higher quality schools find it more costly to join
the targeted voucher program. Specifically, an increase in one standard deviation
in schools’ unobserved quality increases the cost of participating in the program
by $9,271, although this difference is not statistically significant. Similarly, a one
standard deviation increase in schools’ teachers quality increases the program par-
ticipation cost by $40,578. Secular schools find it more costly to join the targeted
voucher program than religious schools, by approximately $36,337.28
26There is a long literature that documents the high wages advantage of cities relative to rural
areas. See, for instance, Bryan et al. (2014) for a study that investigates the migration behavior
of individuals in Bangladesh, motivated by the higher returns to labor found in the cities.
27Recall from section 3.4.2 that the marginal cost of educating non-disadvantaged students
is identified from schools participating in the targeted program, whereas the marginal cost of
educating both disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged students is identified from schools that do
not participate in the program.
28These results correspond to the interpretation of the program participation cost representing
perceived increase in bureaucracy associated to participation and/or school’s own preference for
participation described in section 3.4.2.
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Table 3.10: Estimates for Supply Model
coef. std. err.
marginal cost ($100):
unobserved quality 0.279 0.056
teachers quality 0.296 0.062
secular 0.128 0.103
rural -1.699 0.284




unobserved quality 9.271 6.980




no. of private-voucher schools 1,110
Notes: The first panel reports estimates of marginal cost parameters of a Tobit model for tuition.
The model includes market fixed-effects, but those estimates are not reported. The second panel
reports estimates of fixed cost parameters of a probit model for participation in the targeted voucher
program. The tuition function for the case the school participates in the targeted program differs
from the tuition function for the case the school opts out of the program only by the intercept,
which is equal to the coefficient for the participation in the program dummy plus the constant for
the case the school participates in the program, and only to the constant for the case the school opts
out. All marginal and fixed cost parameters were estimated using a GMM procedure coupled with
a nested fixed-point algorithm. Costs are in real prices for the year 2013, and were transformed
from Ch$ to US$ according to the exchange rate as of March 1, 2013 (472.96 Ch$/US$).
Table 3.11 presents the predicted mean and median marginal and program par-
ticipation costs for schools, which were constructed using the estimates presented in
Table 3.10. The average (median) marginal cost of educating a non-disadvantaged
student is $237 ($279), about half as much as the average (median) marginal cost of
educating both disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged students, $553 ($595). Also,
the average (median) private-voucher school has negative program participation
costs, of about −$158, 000 (−$156, 000), meaning that it finds it attractive to join
112
the targeted program even if it incurs in some loss in profits by doing so. Negative
participation costs may be interpreted as the result of the existence of non-monetary
benefits associated to the participation in the program (e.g. preference for attract-
ing disadvantaged students), or to efficiency gains associated to participation. Other
interpretations may also be possible, and I remain agnostic about which interpreta-
tion is more plausible, as my model does not allow me to identify the sources and
motivations that underlie the participation cost.







Notes: This tables presents the mean and median of predicted schools’ marginal and program
participation costs’ distributions, which were constructed by using the estimated costs’ parameters
from the GMM-NFXP procedure. Costs are in real prices for the year 2013, and were transformed
from Ch$ to US$ according to the exchange rate as of March 1, 2013 (472.96 Ch$/US$).
Figure 3.11 complements the results for the program participation cost from
Table 3.11. Panel A plots the relationship between schools’ predicted participation
cost (y-axis) and unobserved quality (x-axis). Analogously, Panel B displays the re-
lationship between schools’ predicted participation cost (y-axis) and teachers quality
(x-axis). There exists a positive correlation between schools’ program participation
cost and both measures of quality, suggesting that higher quality schools find it
more costly to participate in the targeted program than lower quality schools, all
else equal. Put differently, for the same gain in profits, a low-quality school is more
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likely to decide to join the targeted voucher program than a high-quality school.
This is an important empirical result, that has not been documented in other stud-
ies, and that speaks directly to the evidence reported in Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2018)
for the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP), a targeted voucher program currently
in operation in the state of Louisiana. Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2018) document large
negative effects of attending private-voucher schools on test scores (of about 0.4
standard deviations for math), and suggest that such finding may be explained by
the fact that the private schools that are part of the LSP are predominantly low-
quality. In fact, they show that, among all the private schools that were invited to
participate in the LSP, the ones that joined the program were schools that had been
continuously failing and losing students in the years that preceded the program.
This result is also important because it can help policymakers to have and idea of
which are the schools that may choose to participate in a targeted voucher program
given a particular design (e.g. amount of the subsidy).
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Notes: This figure displays the relationship between schools’ predicted program participation cost
and two measures of schools’ quality. Panel A plots the relationship between schools’ participation
cost (y-axis) and unobserved quality (x-axis), whereas Panel B plots the relationship between
schools’ participation cost (y-axis) and teachers quality (x-axis). Schools’ predicted participation
costs were constructed using the estimated costs’ parameters from the GMM-NFXP procedure.
Costs are in real prices for the year 2013, and were transformed from Ch$ to US$ according to the
exchange rate as of March 1, 2013 (472.96 Ch$/US$).
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3.6 Policy Analysis and Counterfactuals
I use the model and its estimated parameters to study the economic conse-
quences of a variety of counterfactual policy scenarios. I am mostly interested in
understanding whether and how schools respond to changes in the voucher subsidies.
I focus on schools’ program participation and tuition setting responses to policies.
I also investigate whether and how such responses affect students’ school choices.
My counterfactual policy analyses are motivated by actual policies that have
recently been implemented in Chile. In 2016, and as part of a series of major
reforms to all levels of the education system, the Ley de Inclusión Escolar law
began to operate. This law introduced various changes to the regulations applicable
to schools, including important increases to the voucher subsidies.29 These increases
include a rise in the universal subsidy, a new per-student voucher for schools that do
not charge tuition, an increase in the targeted voucher, and a new per-disadvantaged
student voucher to students in the third and fourth quintiles in the household income
distribution (also for schools not charging tuition). The ultimate goal of these
voucher increases is to end up with a system where no school charges top-up fees.
The introduction of reform has been gradual, both in terms of the voucher increases,
and geographically, with smaller regions entering first to the new regime. When fully
implemented, it is estimated that the reform will increase the total government
29Overall, the law has three major pillars: 1) the end of copayment, implemented via increases
in the vouchers; 2) the end of selection from the part of schools when oversubscribed, implemented
via the introduction of lotteries to assign seats at schools; and 3) the end of the profit-seeking
motive in private-voucher schools. In this paper, I focus on the increase-in-vouchers part of the
law.
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spending by about 20–30%.
As is usual with important reforms in education, proponents and detractors
abound. Proponents argue that the goal of no tuition in schools is key to transform
the current system into a more equitable one, and that the changes are in line with
that objective. Detractors, in turn, argue that the reform is is too complex, and that
it involves too many changes and additions to the voucher system without paying
attention to schools’ responses, which could lead to undesirable and unintended
consequences.30
My goal with the policy simulations is to study the consequences of particular
changes in the vouchers, and the mechanisms through which those consequences
occur, paying special attention to schools’ responses to policies. I do not aim to
predict the consequences of the reform that is actually being implemented, because
it involves aspects other than the voucher changes, which my model is silent about.
I instead intend to inform policymakers about whether and how schools respond to
particular changes in the voucher policies, and how such responses affect students’
school choices.
I perform two series of counterfactual exercises. First, I study schools’ pro-
gram participation response to a set of different targeted voucher amounts, that
range between 30% and 200% the 2013 subsidy level. I examine whether higher
subsidy amounts attract more schools to participate in the targeted program, and
whether the response of low-quality schools is different from the response of high-
30These and other arguments can be found in the transcript of the 120th session of Chile’s
Chamber of Deputies, January 26, 2015.
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quality schools. The targeted program constitutes an important policy tool to bring
tuition costs to zero for disadvantaged students, and therefore the study of schools’
participation decisions is central to understand the capabilities of governments to
lower tuition costs through the targeted voucher.
Second, I study the economic consequences of a 20% increase in the total
budget that the government spends in vouchers, and that is implemented either as
an increase in the level of the universal voucher, or as an increase in the level of
the targeted voucher. I investigate the responses of schools to these policies, and
the corresponding effect on students’ school choices. 20% is about the percentage
increase in government’s spending induced by the actual reform being implemented
in Chile. As stated above, instead of mimicking the actual policy, I choose to
analyze separate increases in each of the vouchers, which can help to disentangle
the mechanisms through which each of the vouchers operate.
3.6.1 Targeted Voucher Policies
I simulate the estimated model under seven different policy scenarios, where
in each of them I keep the universal voucher fixed to its actual value ($1,220 for
the year 2013), and set the level of the targeted voucher to either $200, $400, $600,
$800, $1,000, $1,200, or $1,400.31 I study schools’ program participation decisions
in each of the counterfactuals.
Table 3.12 presents schools’ program participation behavior in each of the
seven counterfactual scenarios. The first column presents the level of the targeted
31The actual value of the targeted voucher for the year 2013 is $717 (see Table 4.1).
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voucher with which the model was simulated and the results obtained. The second
column presents the total number of private-voucher schools that participate in the
targeted program at each level of the targeted voucher. The third column presents
the total number of private-voucher schools that opt out of the targeted program
at each level of the targeted voucher. The fourth column presents the number
of additional private-voucher schools that join the program at each level of the
targeted voucher, relative to the number of private-voucher schools that are part of
the program when the level of the targeted voucher is $200 lower. For example, the
number of additional schools that join the program when the targeted voucher level
is $400 is equal to the total number of schools that participate in the program at the
targeted voucher level of $400 minus the total number of schools that participate in
the program at the targeted voucher level of $200. For the targeted voucher level of
$200, the number of additional schools joining the program is set to be the same as
the total number of schools that participate in the program.
At the lowest level of the targeted voucher analyzed, $200, there are 606
private-voucher schools that decide to participate in the targeted program. These
schools represent about 55% of all private-voucher schools.32 This high response
of schools to the positive but relatively small targeted voucher amount of $200 is
somewhat expected, considering that many private-voucher schools are predicted
to have negative program participation costs (see Figure 3.11), meaning that they
find it optimal to participate in the program even if that results in a reduction in
profits (before accounting for the program participation cost). For higher levels of
32The total number of private-voucher schools in the sample is 1,110.
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the targeted voucher, larger sets of schools choose to join the targeted program. For
instance, 62 additional private-voucher schools join the program when the targeted
voucher is increased from $200 to $400. Likewise, 60 additional schools join the tar-
geted program when the targeted voucher is increased from $400 to $600. Even more
schools join the program when the targeted voucher is further increased, although
the number of new schools joining the program is smaller the higher the level of the
targeted voucher.33 At the targeted voucher level of $1,400, which is about twice as
large as the actual level ($717), 875 private-voucher schools decide to participate in
the targeted program, which represents about 79% of all private-voucher schools in
the sample. This result shows that, even for relatively high levels of the targeted
subsidy, there is still a non-negligible group of schools that find it unattractive to
join the targeted voucher program. However, possibly more important than the
number of schools that stay out of the program is the identity (i.e. characteristics)
of those schools. Put differently, a policymaker is likely to be less concerned of a
targeted voucher program not being able to attract a set of schools if those schools
are predominantly low-quality than if they are high-quality.
33Note, too, that the percentage of new schools joining the program is always around 10-14%
relative to the set of schools that do not participate in the program. For instance, of the 504
schools that are not part of the program at the targeted voucher level of $200, 62 of them (12.3%)
decide to join the program when the targeted voucher level is increased to $400.
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Table 3.12: Schools’ Program Participation Responses to Targeted Voucher Policies
subsidy schools schools additional schools
amount in program not in program joining program
$200 606 504 606
$400 668 442 62
$600 728 382 60
$800 772 338 44
$1,000 812 298 40
$1,200 849 261 37
$1,400 875 235 26
Notes: This table presents the program participation responses of private-voucher schools to seven
different levels of the targeted voucher. The first column displays the targeted voucher level with
which the model was simulated and the results obtained. The second column displays the total
number of private-voucher schools that participate in the targeted program for each level of the
targeted voucher. The third column displays the total number of private-voucher schools that do
not participate in the targeted program for each level of the targeted voucher. The fourth column
displays the number of additional schools that join the targeted program for each level of the
targeted voucher, relative to the number of schools that participate in the targeted program when
the targeted voucher level is $200 lower. For instance, for the targeted voucher level of $400, there
are 668 private-voucher schools that participate in the program, which exceeds in 62 the number of
private-voucher schools that are part of the program when the level of the targeted voucher is $200
(606). Therefore, there are 62 additional schools that join the program at the targeted voucher
level of $400. For the targeted voucher level of $200, the number of additional schools joining
the program is the same as the total number of private-vouchers schools in the program. Voucher
amounts are in real prices for the year 2013, and were transformed from Ch$ to US$ according to
the exchange rate as of March 1, 2013 (472.96 Ch$/US$). The total number of private-voucher
schools is 1,110.
Figure 3.12 complements the results from Table 3.12. It displays average qual-
ity measures for the set of additional schools that join the targeted program at each of
the seven levels of the targeted voucher analyzed. Panel A plots additional schools’
average unobserved quality, while panel B does analogously for schools’ teachers
quality. At the targeted voucher level of $200, schools’ average quality measures
are calculated for all private-voucher schools that participate in the program, and
serve as a reference to compare against schools’ quality measures at higher levels of
the targeted voucher. At higher levels of the targeted voucher, the average quality
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measures are calculated only for the additional schools joining the program.34 Two
important patterns emerge. First, the average quality of the schools that are part
of the program when the targeted voucher is $200 is considerably lower than the
average quality of every set of new schools joining the program at higher levels of the
targeted voucher. This is true for both unobserved and teachers quality measures.
Second, the average teachers quality of the new schools in the program is higher
the higher the level of the targeted voucher. This observed pattern is not exactly
the same for the unobserved quality measure, but every set of additional schools
is of higher unobserved quality (on average) than the reference set of schools that
participate in the program at the targeted voucher level of $200. This finding is
consistent with the estimation results for schools’ program participation costs (see
Figure 3.11), and suggests that higher quality schools find it particularly costly to
participate in the program, and are therefore less likely to be part of the program
than lower quality schools. A policy implication of this finding is that policymakers
need to be sufficiently generous if they want to attract high-quality schools to par-
ticipate in a targeted voucher program. That is, they should set a relatively high
targeted voucher amount.35 Once again, this result is directly related to the evidence
in Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2018), where one could argue that the negative effects of
attending voucher schools may well be mitigated by increasing the subsidy offered
to participating schools, thus making more attractive the option of participating in
34For each targeted voucher level of $400 and higher, additional schools are schools that partic-
ipate in the program at the corresponding targeted voucher level, but that do not participate in
the program at lower levels of the targeted voucher.
35Another policy implication is to somehow lower the costs of joining the program, especially for
high-quality schools. This could be achieved by, for example, cutting down bureaucracies in the
joining process.
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the program to higher quality schools.
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Notes: This figure plots the average unobserved and teachers quality of the additional private-
voucher schools the join the targeted program at each level of the targeted voucher, relative to the
private-voucher schools that are part of the program when the level of the targeted voucher is $200
lower. For the targeted voucher level of $200, the average quality of the additional private-voucher
schools is the same as the average quality of all private-voucher schools that participate in the
program. Voucher amounts are in real prices for the year 2013, and were transformed from Ch$
to US$ according to the exchange rate as of March 1, 2013 (472.96 Ch$/US$).
124
3.6.2 Expansion in Government Spending
I study the economic consequences of expanding the total budget that the gov-
ernment spends in vouchers by 20%. I am interested in studying schools’ responses
to and equilibrium effects of two specific policies, that represent different ways of
allocating the extra funding and therefore of implementing the budget expansion.
Specifically, I investigate schools and students’ responses when all the extra funding
is allocated to increase the universal voucher, as well as their responses when all
the extra funding is allocated to increase the targeted voucher. For a reference,
I also look at responses in a baseline scenario where both the universal and tar-
geted vouchers remain unchanged at their actual levels (as of 2013). Table 3.13
displays the exact voucher amounts used in each of the counterfactual scenarios. In
the baseline scenario, the universal and targeted vouchers are kept at their actual
levels of $1,220 and $717, respectively. In the scenario where the universal voucher
is increased, its amount is set to $1,562, and the amount of the targeted voucher
is kept at $717. Finally, in the scenario where the targeted voucher is increased,
the universal voucher is kept at $1,220, and the targeted voucher is set to $1,256.
The increases in the voucher amounts are such that they effectively result in a 20%
increase in government’s spending, and were calibrated using simulations of the
model.
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Table 3.13: Voucher Amounts in Counterfactual Scenarios
baseline increase in increase in
universal voucher targeted voucher
universal voucher ($) 1,220 1,562 1,220
targeted voucher ($) 717 717 1,256
Notes: This table presents the exact voucher amounts used in each of the counterfactual scenarios.
The increases in the voucher amounts are such that they approximately result in a 20% increase
in government’s spending, and were calibrated using several simulations of the model.
Table 3.14 presents schools’ responses in program participation under each
policy scenario. These responses are analyzed relative to the baseline scenario of no
increase in the voucher amounts. The table reports the number of private-voucher
schools that join the program after an increase in each of the vouchers, as well
as the number of private-voucher schools that leave the program after the voucher
changes. For a reference, it also presents the total number of private-voucher schools
that are part of the program in the baseline scenario, as well as the total number of
private-voucher schools that are not part of the program in the baseline scenario. An
increase in the universal voucher induces some schools to leave the targeted voucher
program. More precisely, 98 of the 752 private-voucher schools that participate in
the program in the baseline decide to leave the program after an increase of $342 in
the universal voucher. These schools represent 13% of the group that participate in
the program in the baseline. No new school is attracted to join the program. The
response from schools is sizable, although it does not constitute a massive flight out
of the program, as even after accounting for the leaving schools, more than half of
all private-voucher schools still participate in the program. A simple rationale for
explaining this result (some schools leaving, no school joining the program) comes
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from the fact that a rise in the universal voucher increases the importance of the
universal voucher relative to the targeted voucher in schools’ profits, and therefore
the targeted program becomes less attractive for schools.
An increase of $539 in the targeted voucher attracts an important number of
additional schools to join the program. Specifically, 104 of the 358 private-voucher
schools that do not participate in the program in the baseline decide to join the
program after the rise in the targeted voucher. These schools represent 29% of the
private-voucher schools that were not part of the program in the baseline. The
response is sizable (as is the increase in the voucher), and its rationale is in that a
higher targeted voucher makes the targeted program to be a more attractive option
for many private-voucher schools, since it directly increases their profits for the case
they join the program.
Table 3.14: Schools’ Program Participation Responses in Counterfactual Scenarios
increase in increase in
universal voucher targeted voucher
joining program 0 104
leaving program 98 0
in program (baseline) 752
not in program (baseline) 358
Notes: This table presents schools’ program participation responses in the two counterfactual
scenarios studied (increase in the universal voucher, and increase in the targeted voucher). The
table reports the number of private-voucher schools that join the program, as well as the number
of private-voucher schools that leave the program, in each policy scenario. It also presents the
number of private-voucher schools that do and do not participate in the program in the baseline
scenario.
It is also important to look at the characteristics of the schools that either
join or leave the program after increases in the vouchers. In a program evaluation
language, these schools are the compliers; that is, they are the schools that re-
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spond to changes in exogenous parameters (i.e vouchers) by changing their program
participation behavior. Figures 3.13 and 3.14 display the unobserved and teachers
characteristics of the complier schools in each of the counterfactuals. Figure 3.13
plots the quality distributions of the private-voucher schools that leave the program
after an increase in the universal voucher, and compare them with the quality distri-
butions of the schools that remain in the program after the policy change. Panel A
presents schools’ unobserved quality distributions, while Panel B does analogously
for schools’ teachers quality. Though there is substantial overlap between compli-
ers’ and non-compliers’ quality distributions, the schools leaving the program are in
general of higher quality than the schools staying in the program. This is especially
true for schools’ teachers quality. Thus, an increase in the universal voucher not
only results in a number of schools leaving the targeted program, but also in that
the program loses some of its highest quality schools.
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Notes: This figure plots the unobserved and teachers quality distributions of the private-voucher
schools that decide to leave the targeted program after an increase of $342 in the universal voucher,
and compare them with the quality distributions of the private-voucher schools that choose to
remain in the program after the same increase in the universal voucher. Panel A displays schools’
unobserved quality distributions, while Panel B does analogously for schools’ teachers quality
distributions.
129
Figure 3.14 presents the unobserved and teachers quality distributions of the
schools that decide to join the targeted program after an increase of $539 in the
targeted voucher (and that do not participate in the program absent the voucher
increase), and compare them with the quality distributions of the schools that par-
ticipate in the program absent the policy change. Panel A plots schools’ unobserved
quality distributions, while Panel B does analogously for schools’ teachers quality
distributions. There exists an important overlap between the distributions of the two
groups of schools. Nonetheless, the schools joining the program after the increase in
the targeted voucher are in general of higher quality than their counterparts in the
program. Thus, an increase in the targeted voucher not only attracts more schools
to participate in the targeted program, but it also tends to attract schools of higher
quality than the ones that participate absent the voucher increase.
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Notes: This figure plots the unobserved and teachers quality distributions of the private-voucher
schools that decide to join the targeted program after an increase of $539 in the targeted voucher
(and that do not participate in the program absent the policy change), and compare them with
the quality distributions of schools that participate in the targeted program absent the increase in
the targeted voucher. Panel A displays schools’ unobserved quality distributions, while Panel B
does analogously for schools’ teachers quality distributions.
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The results presented in Table 3.14 and Figures 3.13 and 3.14 describe two
important supply responses to voucher policies. The implications of the changes
in each of the vouchers are sizable and go in opposite direction. In particular, an
increase in the universal voucher leaves the targeted program with less but also
lower quality participating schools. Conversely, an increase in the targeted voucher
increases the number of schools that participate in the program, but also the new
participating schools are in general of higher quality than the rest of the participating
schools.
Another channel through which schools respond to changes in the vouchers
is via tuition. According to schools’ optimality conditions (see Section 3.4.2), the
universal voucher plays both a direct and an indirect role in determining tuition lev-
els, whereas the targeted voucher’s role in tuition setting is only indirect (through
schools’ demand). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that schools’ tuition levels
be more sensitive to changes in the universal voucher than to changes in the targeted
voucher. Figure 3.15 displays average tuition levels under each counterfactual sce-
nario. It shows both average tuition charged to non-disadvantaged students (i.e. full
tuition) and average tuition charged to disadvantaged students. An increase of $342
in the universal voucher lowers the average tuition charged to non-disadvantaged
students from $332 to $132. Put differently, a $1 increase in the universal voucher
translates into a $0.58 decrease in average full tuition. The fall in average tuition
charged to disadvantaged students is also important, going from $275 to $92. On
the other hand, the targeted voucher has a much smaller effect in tuition. Specifi-
cally, a $539 increase in the targeted voucher decreases the average tuition charged
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to non-disadvantaged students by only $14, going from $332 to $318. Similarly, it
decreases the tuition charged to disadvantaged students by $55, going from $275 to
$220.36


























Notes: This figure presents average tuition levels of private-voucher schools under each of three
counterfactual scenarios: baseline, increase of $342 in the universal voucher, increase of $539 in
the targeted voucher. It distinguishes between tuition charged to non-disadvantaged students and
tuition charged to disadvantaged students. Voucher amounts are in real prices for the year 2013,
and were transformed from Ch$ to US$ according to the exchange rate as of March 1, 2013 (472.96
Ch$/US$).
Table 3.14 and Figures 3.13-3.15 have shown two different mechanisms through
which schools respond to changes in the vouchers: program participation and tuition
setting. A careful evaluation of a voucher policy needs to account for both types of
responses. Failure to do so, may lead policymakers to make inaccurate conclusions.
36All results account for the program participation response of schools to the voucher increases.
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For instance, if a policymaker considers only the program participation response of
schools, it may be led to prefer an increase in the targeted voucher over an increase
in the universal voucher, because the former increases the quantity and quality of
the schools that predominantly serve disadvantaged students. On the contrary, if
the same policymaker considers only the tuition response of schools, it may prefer
to increase the universal voucher over increasing the targeted voucher, as the former
has a steeper effect in driving down tuition for all students.
More importantly, supply responses are of interest because they have conse-
quences on students’ choices and welfare. For example, more schools participating
in the targeted voucher program may induce some disadvantaged students to switch
to a new participating school. Similarly, lower tuitions may give some financially
constrained students access to otherwise high-tuition schools. Figure 3.16 gives
a picture of the school switches that occur under each counterfactual, relative to
the baseline scenario of no voucher increase. It displays the percentage of stu-
dents that switch to a different school than the one they attend in the baseline,
and distinguishes between non-disadvantaged and disadvantaged students. 11.4%
of non-disadvantaged and 6.8% of disadvantaged students choose a different school
when the universal voucher is increased. Likewise, 2.2% of non-disadvantaged and
4.1% of disadvantaged students choose a different school when the targeted voucher
is increased. These results can be interpreted as an increase in mobility for stu-
dents, where supply responses in the form of lower prices allow some financially
constrained individuals to choose schools that would otherwise be too expensive for
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them to attend.37 Note also that the universal voucher policy produces a higher
share of students switching schools than the targeted voucher policy. However, in
relative terms, a higher share of non-disadvantaged students switch schools relative
to disadvantaged students under the universal voucher policy, while the opposite
occurs under the targeted voucher policy.






















increase universal increase targeted
Non-disadvantaged Disadvantaged
Notes: This figure displays the percentage of students that switch to a different school under each
of the counterfactual scenarios, relative to the school they choose in the baseline. It distinguishes
between non-disadvantaged and disadvantaged students.
It is also important to examine whether students that switch schools are
37Note that the two types of supply responses I study in this paper, i.e. program participation
and tuition setting, are essentially two different mechanisms that schools use to price-respond
to voucher policies. By choosing to participate in the targeted program, schools are actually
choosing to (second degree) price discriminate among students, where they charge no tuition to
disadvantaged students, and may charge a positive amount to non-disadvantaged. Tuition setting
is, evidently, a price response as well.
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switching to schools of higher quality. From a policy perspective, this matters when-
ever a policymaker is interested in identifying policies that facilitate students’ access
to high quality schools. Figure 3.17 displays, for each counterfactual, the percentage
of students that switch to a school of higher quality, given that they switch at all.
It distinguishes between non-disadvantaged and disadvantaged students. Panel A
shows results for schools’ unobserved quality measure, while Panel B does analo-
gously for schools’ teachers quality. Under each of the policies, the majority of stu-
dents switch to schools of higher quality. This is true for both non-disadvantaged
and disadvantaged students, and when looking at either of the quality measures.
Specifically, 64.5% of non-disadvantaged and 61.3% of disadvantaged switcher stu-
dents switch to a school of higher unobserved quality when the universal voucher is
increased, while 51.8% of non-disadvantaged and 61.2% of disadvantaged switchers
do so when the targeted voucher is increased. Similarly, 71.7% of non-disadvantaged
and 76.2% of disadvantaged switcher students switch to a schools of higher teachers
quality when the universal voucher is increased, while 61.9% of non-disadvantaged
and 75.4% of disadvantaged switchers do so when the targeted voucher is increased.
These results are in line with the demand estimates from Table 3.9, where we noted
that students have strong preferences for schools’ quality, but dislike high tuition
levels. As such, any policy that is able to drive down tuition levels is likely to
increase demand for high quality schools.
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increase universal increase targeted
Non-disadvantaged Disadvantaged
Notes: This figure displays, for each counterfactual scenario, the percentage of students that
switch to a school of higher quality, given that they switch at all, and relative to the quality of the
school they choose in the baseline. It distinguishes between non-disadvantaged and disadvantaged
students. Panel A shows results for schools’ unobserved quality measure, while Panel B does
analogously for schools’ teachers quality.
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Table 3.15 complements the analysis from Figures 3.16 and 3.17. It shows the
average difference in characteristics between the schools chosen by the switchers in
each counterfactual scenario and the schools chosen by the switchers in the base-
line scenarios. It includes the unobserved and teachers quality measures, distance
travelled, and the probabilities that the school is private-voucher, rural, and secular
as school characteristics. The table also distinguishes between non-disadvantaged
and disadvantaged students. As shown in Figures 3.16 and 3.17, switchers, both
non-disadvantaged and disadvantaged, switch to schools of higher quality on av-
erage. More precisely, switchers choose schools that are about 0.22–0.65σ higher
in the quality measures. The only exception is non-disadvantaged students under
the policy that increases the targeted voucher, where on average switchers choose
a school that is 0.05σ lower in unobserved quality. However, that same group of
students choose schools that are on average 0.22σ higher in teachers quality.
Table 3.15 also shows that the increase in the universal voucher policy induces
non-disadvantaged (disadvantaged) students to switch to schools that are on average
2.5 (2.9) meters farther away than the baseline school. Conversely, the increase in
the targeted voucher policy induces non-disadvantaged (disadvantaged) students to
switch to schools that are on average 26.5 (3.4) meters closer than the baseline school.
A priori, it is not obvious whether lower prices that result from the counterfactual
policies should induce students to switch to schools that are farther away or closer
to the students’ home. It depends on the spatial distribution of the schools that are
responding to the policies, as well as on the location of the residences of the switching
students, among other things. For instance, if a high-quality school lowering its
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tuition due to a policy is located far away from a student’s residence, then one
might expect that student to be more likely to attend the high-quality school after
the implementation of the policy. And the opposite is expected to occur if the
high-quality school lowering its tuition is located closer to the student’s home.
Switchers are also more likely to choose schools that are private-voucher, ur-
ban, and religious under each of the counterfactual policies. The results for the
private-voucher and urban characteristics follow a similar intuition than the results
found for the quality measures, which is that we expect that students be more likely
to attend schools with the characteristics they enjoy after a reduction in the tu-
ition levels due to a policy, whenever those characteristics are priced higher in the
absence of the policy (see Tables 3.4, 3.9 and 3.10). The result found for the secu-
lar/religious characteristic of schools is likely to be due to the positive correlation
between high-quality schools and their likelihood of being religious. For instance,
if a high-quality school is also religious, and the student cares more about quality
than whether the school is secular (see Table 3.9), then a fall in tuition levels due
to a policy should increase the likelihood that a student attends a religious school
(that is also high-quality).
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Table 3.15: Characteristics of Schools Chosen by Switchers in Counterfactual Sce-
narios
students: non-disadvantaged disadvantaged
counterfactual: universal targeted universal targeted
unobserved quality (std. dev.) 0.397 -0.050 0.299 0.313
teachers quality (std. dev.) 0.495 0.220 0.649 0.289
distance (km) 0.025 -0.265 0.099 -0.034
private voucher (p.p.) 0.410 0.176 0.502 0.438
rural (p.p.) -0.018 -0.015 -0.018 -0.022
secular (p.p.) -0.137 -0.412 -0.095 -0.270
Notes: This table displays the average difference in the characteristics of the schools chosen by the
switchers in each of the counterfactual scenarios and the characteristics of the schools chosen by the
switchers in the baseline scenario. It distinguishes between non-disadvantaged and disadvantaged
students.
Finally, I analyze students’ welfare changes associated to each voucher policy.
To do so, I take advantage of the logit specification assumed for the error term in





























where β̂1i is student i’s estimated coefficient for tuition in the indirect utility.
Figure 3.18 displays the aggregate welfare changes associated to each coun-
terfactual voucher policy, relative to the baseline scenario. It distinguishes between
non-disadvantaged and disadvantaged students’ welfare changes. Both policies pro-
duce sizable welfare gains, for both types of students. More precisely, increasing the
universal voucher by $342 produces aggregate welfare gains of about $77.6 million
and $26.6 million for non-disadvantaged and disadvantaged students, respectively.
On the other hand, increasing the targeted voucher by $539 produces aggregate
welfare gains of about $6 million and $14.3 million for non-disadvantaged and dis-
advantaged students, respectively.
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increase universal increase targeted
Non-disadvantaged Disadvantaged
Notes: This figure displays changes in aggregate students’ welfare associated to each counterfactual
voucher policy, relative to the baseline scenario of no voucher increase. It distinguishes between
non-disadvantaged and disadvantaged students. Welfare measures are in real prices for the year
2013, and were transformed from Ch$ to US$ according to the exchange rate as of March 1, 2013
(472.96 Ch$/US$).
When comparing the welfare results of the two voucher policies, we have that
the increase in the universal voucher policy produces larger aggregate welfare gains
than the increase in the targeted voucher policy, overall and for each type of student.
However, the universal voucher policy produces more gains for non-disadvantaged
than for disadvantaged students, thus widening the welfare gap between the two
groups.38 On the contrary, the targeted voucher policy produces larger welfare
38Recall from Section 3.5 that the student population is approximately evenly distributed be-
tween disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged students. Specifically, in my sample, 53% of stu-
dents are classified as being disadvantaged, while the remaining 47% are considered to be non-
disadvantaged.
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gains for disadvantaged than for non-disadvantaged students, therefore narrowing
the gap in welfare between the groups. Thus, a policymaker that is interested
in maximizing aggregate welfare among students would tend to prefer increasing
the universal voucher, while a policymaker that is more concerned about welfare
inequality results would tend to prefer increasing the targeted voucher.
3.7 Conclusions
This paper empirically studies the program participation and tuition setting
behavior of Chilean elementary private-voucher schools in a context in which they
are eligible to receive a universal voucher and a targeted voucher, and investigates
how such behavior determines students’ school choices. To that aim, I build and
estimate a model of demand and supply of schools that approximates the Chilean
elementary education system. I use the model and its estimated parameters to
produce counterfactuals and learn about schools’ and students’ responses to different
policy scenarios. I show that schools respond substantially to changes in the voucher
amounts, and that the mechanisms through which they respond greatly depend on
whether the change in policy affects the universal or the targeted vouchers. In
particular, I find that a higher targeted voucher attracts more schools to join the
targeted voucher program, but that high quality schools join only if the subsidy is
sufficiently high. I also find that a higher universal subsidy induces schools to lower
their tuition. Specifically, a $1 increase in the universal subsidy translates into a
$0.58 decrease in average tuition. Finally, I quantify the consequences that these
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supply responses to policies have on students’ mobility and welfare. I show that
policies that favor the universal voucher are more mobility- and welfare-enhancing
in the aggregate, but that policies favoring the targeted voucher are more effective
in narrowing the welfare gap between low- and high-income students.
This paper’s analysis captures schools’ program participation and pricing be-
havior relatively well, and is able to generate intuitive predictions for different
counterfactual voucher policies. To the best of my knowledge, this a novel fea-
ture for models that combine demand and supply decisions in elementary school
markets. Nevertheless, my model has some limitations. For instance, I do not
allow for voucher policies to affect schools’ productivity or quality levels. Other
studies (Neilson, 2013; Correa et al., 2014; Murnane et al., 2017) have found im-
portant improvements in schools’ productivity associated to the introduction of the
targeted voucher in Chile. Although, more recent studies (e.g. Feigenberg et al.,
2017; Sánchez, 2018a) have challenged such findings, arguing that a more careful
analysis of the data shows smaller or no improvement in schools’ productivity at-
tributed to the targeted voucher. This paper’s future agenda includes incorporating
an economic and empirical channel that links changes in voucher policies to potential
changes in school productivity.
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Chapter 4: Skipping your Exam? The Unexpected Response to a
Targeted Voucher Policy
4.1 Introduction
The educational literature that studies education markets that include voucher
subsidies and school choice often focuses its attention on the demand side of these
markets (i.e. students, parents).1 They typically answer important policy questions,
such as what are the gains in academic performance and achievement of attending
a private school versus a public one, or what are the factors that determine parental
school choice. However, in most of the cases, voucher policies involve conditions and
changes in regulation that also affect the supply side of the education markets. It
thus becomes crucial to understand how schools react to changes in policies if we
want to have a clear picture of all the effects of such policies.2 In this paper, I study
how schools responded to a recent targeted voucher reform in Chile that considerably
increased the funding per-student, but that also required a rapid increase in schools’
1See Angrist et al. (2002), Angrist et al. (2006), Hsieh and Urquiola (2006), Hastings and
Weinstein (2008), Gallego and Hernando (2009), Rouse and Barrow (2009), Bravo et al. (2010),
Bettinger (2011), and Carneiro et al. (2013), among others.
2See Bau (2014), and Dinerstein and Smith (2014) for two recent studies that effectively ac-
count for schools responses to policy changes when investigating the consequences of policies on
educational outcomes.
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performance to secure the receipt of the subsidy.
In 2008, the Chilean government introduced a new subsidy in the form of a
targeted voucher for disadvantaged students, that supplemented the existing per-
student flat voucher. Schools participating in the new program receive extra funds
for every disadvantaged student that they enroll, in addition to the base voucher
common to all students. The size of the new funds are considerable, representing
about 60% the amount of the base voucher. A novelty of this reform is that, for
the first time, the payment of the subsidy is contingent on the school improving its
performance on standardized tests. This condition is closely monitored and regularly
enforced by the government. The idea that motivates this condition is to make sure
that participating schools exert enough effort to improve the quality of the education
they provide.
Neilson (2013) and Correa et al. (2014) have recently documented large im-
pacts of this targeted voucher reform on the performance of students and schools
affected by the program. Specifically, Neilson (2013) finds that disadvantaged stu-
dents increased their performance on standardized test scores by 0.2σ due to the
targeted voucher reform.3 Similarly, Correa et al. (2014) find that the program had
an impact of 0.12–0.18σ on schools’ performance on standardized test scores four
years after the introduction of the reform. Though encouraging, this evidence is not
in line with audit studies and papers that document large inefficiencies in the use of
the new subsidies from the part of schools, and that only few institutions were able
to effectively take advantage of the increased funds received through the program
3σ denotes standard deviation units.
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(de la Republica, 2012; Raczynski et al., 2013). Thus, it remains unclear what were
the actions that participating schools took in order to increase their performance on
standardized test scores.
I investigate a potential mechanism that schools can use to effectively and
rapidly increase their performance on standardized test scores. National standard-
ized exams in Chile are taken simultaneously by all students in the country in two
specific days, usually in November. To take the tests, students have to attend school
as they normally do in a regular day of class. Thus, an inexpensive mechanism that
schools can use to increase their average performance is to strategically select a
subgroup of high-performing students to take the exams. They can do so by asking
some low-performing students to stay home during the exam days. Whether this
behavior actually occurs remains an empirical question. What is clear is that schools
that participate in the targeted voucher program have strong incentives to engage in
such strategic behavior whenever such action is less costly than actually increasing
the quality of education they provide, and effectively translating that higher quality
into higher test scores. The large literature on education policies suggests that the
latter is very costly.4
By exploiting rich administrative data on students’ and schools’ characteris-
tics, performance, and test-taking rates, I use a difference-in-differences strategy to
show that the targeted voucher reform significantly decreased the likelihood that
low-performing students take the national standardized tests. Specifically, low-
performing students are about 15 percentage points (20%) less likely to take the tests
4See Glewwe (2014), and Evans and Popova (2016a,b).
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due to the program. Furthermore, the introduction of the program did not have an
effect on high-performing students’ likelihood of taking the tests. As a consequence,
this specific strategic response of schools to the targeted voucher program introduced
a bias in the representativeness of the test score distribution, where high-performing
students are over-represented relative to the period before the implementation of the
targeted program. Apart from being novel, this result is important for the imple-
mentation and evaluation of public policies for two main reasons. First, the results
on the national standardized tests are used both by the government to allocate many
of its educational policies (Cuesta et al., 2017), and by families to make their school
choices (Gallego and Hernando, 2009; Cuesta et al., 2017). Therefore, a test score
distribution that is not representative of the true underlying distribution may lead
to inefficiencies in the allocation of resources. Second, this result may invalidate
many of previous studies that use the national standardized test scores as an input
in their analyses (see Neilson, 2013, and Correa et al., 2014, among others).
I also show that the targeted program had somewhat positive effects on schools’
investment in educational inputs, especially those related to the hiring of new teach-
ers, and that it reduced students’ chronic absenteeism.
The paper is organized as follows. After this brief introduction, Section 2
describes the Chilean school system and the targeted voucher reform. Section 3
describes the data. Section 4 presents the identification strategy and shows the
results of the paper. Section 5 concludes.
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4.2 The Chilean School System and the Targeted Voucher Program
Schools in Chile can be organized within three main groups according to their
management and financing scheme: public schools, private-voucher schools, and
private-fee-paying schools. Both public and private-voucher schools are financed by a
per-student voucher subsidy paid by the government directly to the schools. Private-
fee-paying schools are financed by fees charged to parents, and serve the country’s
richest families. Today, 40% of students in elementary grades attend public schools,
52% attend private-voucher schools, and 8% attend private-fee-paying schools.
In 2008, the government introduced a new source of subsidy to complement
the existing flat voucher in the form of a targeted voucher to disadvantaged students.
On February of that year, the Ley de Subvención Escolar Preferencial (SEP) law
that regulates this new subsidy was enacted, and was immediately put into practice
for the 2008 academic year.5 The law mandates that each school that participates
in the program receives an additional subsidy per every disadvantaged student that
they enroll. In addition, they also receive a per-disadvantaged student subsidy
that depends on the share of disadvantaged students enrolled in the school, called
Subvención por Concentración (SC). Participation in the program is voluntary from
the part of schools, and only public and private-voucher schools are eligible to join.
Monitoring from the government is also an important aspect of the reform. At the
moment of joining the program, each school is classified into one of three categories,
that determines the level of monitoring the school receives from the government. The
5The academic year in Chile goes from March through December.
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classification is based on schools’ past standardized test scores and on an poverty
index for the population that is served by the school. A higher classification implies
less monitoring. In addition, all schools are required to set short- and long-term
learning goals (i.e. test score achievements), which are evaluated by the government
at the end of the period. Failing schools are reclassified one level down, and/or
temporally suspended to receive the subsidy, with an eventual permanent exit of
the system.
Table 4.1 displays the evolution of the monthly per-student voucher subsidy
corresponding to elementary grades 1st-4th, decomposed by its different categories,
for the years 2005-2011. Figure 4.1 complements this analysis graphically. The
targeted voucher represents a considerable increase from the original flat voucher, of
about 50–60% the base amount. The SC subsidy, in contrast, is almost negligible,
representing only about 1% the base amount. The base voucher has experienced
slight yearly increases during this period, with the largest increase occurred in 2009.
A similar pattern is observed for the different targeted voucher categories since the
introduction of the reform in 2008.
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Table 4.1: Monthly Voucher Subsidy Decomposition for Students in 1st-4th Grades
subsidy (US$)
category 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
base voucher 36.52 39.21 43.76 51.38 63.40 67.57 72.97
targeted voucher (SEP) – – – 29.85 32.23 34.35 37.10
subsidy by concentration (SC):
15–30% – – – 2.09 2.26 2.40 2.60
30–45% – – – 3.58 3.87 4.12 4.45
45–60% – – – 4.78 5.16 5.50 5.94
more than 60% – – – 5.37 5.80 6.18 6.68
Notes: SEP is the Spanish acronym for the targeted voucher program. SC is the Spanish acronym
for the additional voucher subsidy that depends on the percentage of disadvantaged students in
the school. All values are real, and are converted from Chilean pesos to US dollars according to the
exchange rate of Ch$686.52 per US dollar, as of May 16, 2016. The base voucher values correspond
to those for students at schools with full school shifts.
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Notes: SEP is the Spanish acronym for the targeted voucher program. SC is the Spanish acronym
for the additional voucher subsidy that depends on the percentage of disadvantaged students in
the school. All values are real, and are converted from Chilean pesos to US dollars according
to the exchange rate of Ch$686.52 per US dollar, as of May 16, 2016. The base voucher values
correspond to those for students at schools with full school shifts. The SC values correspond to
those for students in schools with 45–60% of disadvantaged students.
4.3 Data
I combine various administrative data sets of Chilean students and schools for
the years 2005-2011 to form a seven-year (unbalanced) panel sample for schools, and
a seven-year repeated cross-section sample for 4th grade students. I ignore private-
fee-paying schools and their students, as the targeted voucher reform applies only
to public and private-voucher schools. The data were obtained from the Ministry of
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Education and the Agencia de Calidad de la Educación, the government’s agency
in charge of conducting all national standardized examinations in the primary and
secondary levels. The data sets include the censuses of students and schools, the
census of teachers, and the annual national standardized exams for 4th graders. See
appendix A for a more detailed description of each of the data sets I use.
Table 4.2 displays summary statistics for selected variables from this sample.
Panel A shows means and standard deviations for variables at the student level. Boys
and girls are almost equally represented in the data. GPA, on a scale of 1.0–7.0, is
fairly constant at 5.8 across years. Average class attendance is also constant at 93–
94% across years. Both verbal and math scores increase over time, especially after
the implementation of the targeted voucher reform. Test-taking rates are constant
for the pre-reform period, and decrease right after that. The proportion of students
that are recipients of the targeted voucher starts at 29% in 2008, increases to 45%
in 2009, and stays constant at 42% thereafter. A similar pattern is observed for
the proportion of disadvantaged students. Total enrollment for 4th graders slowly
decreases over time, going from 253,223 in 2005 to 224,868 in 2011.
Panel B in Table 4.2 presents means and standard deviations for selected vari-
ables at the school level. The share of public schools decreases over the period stud-
ied, going from 63% in 2005 to 58% in 2011.6 A similar pattern is observed for the
proportion of rural schools. School inputs such class size, proportion of multigrade
classes, average teacher experience, and pupil-teacher ratio show a common pattern,
6This pattern has been shown before in other studies that analyze the Chilean school system.
See, for example, Bravo et al. (2010).
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staying fairly constant in the pre-reform period, and decreasing thereafter. This is
consistent with SEP schools spending the extra funds in performance-enhancing ac-
tivities.7 The proportion of SEP schools slightly increases over time, going from
79% in 2008 to 86% in 2011. Lastly, the total number of schools that offer 4th grade
decreases from 7,963 in 2005 to 7,517 in 2011.
7The decrease in average teacher experience goes in the opposite direction (whenever we believe
that more years of experience implies better quality of teaching), but that could be explained by the
fact that hiring new teachers necessarily implies hiring less experienced teachers if all experienced
teachers are already under a contract in a school.
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for 4th graders
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
A. students
male 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
GPA 5.79 5.78 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.77 5.75
(0.63) (0.62) (0.62) (0.61) (0.59) (0.58) (0.57)
avg. class attendance 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
verbal score 252.5 250.3 251.4 257.4 258.8 268.1 264.2
(52.6) (53.2) (52.7) (52.9) (52.8) (50.1) (50.2)
math score 244.2 244.3 242.2 243.3 248.9 249.0 255.3
(54.5) (55.1) (55.4) (53.7) (53.9) (52.5) (49.6)
test-taking rate 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.85 0.88 0.86
(0.29) (0.31) (0.30) (0.30) (0.36) (0.32) (0.34)
SEP recipient – – – 0.29 0.45 0.42 0.42
– – – (0.45) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49)
disadvantaged student – – – 0.33 0.53 0.49 0.48
– – – (0.47) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
observations 253,223 249,344 241,006 238,196 231,074 234,353 224,868
B. schools
public 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.59 0.58
(0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
rural 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.46
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
class size 24.0 23.9 23.7 23.5 23.3 22.8 22.2
(11.3) (11.2) (11.2) (11.3) (11.2) (11.4) (11.8)
share of multigrade classes 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.23
(0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.44) (0.44) (0.43) (0.40)
avg. teacher experience 18.9 19.5 19.6 18.7 18.0 18.0 15.9
(8.2) (8.3) (8.5) (8.3) (8.2) (8.3) (7.9)
pupil teacher ratio 17.7 17.7 17.3 17.1 16.9 16.3 15.2
(8.2) (8.2) (8.4) (8.6) (15.4) (11.1) (11.1)
SEP school – – – 0.79 0.83 0.84 0.86
– – – (0.41) (0.38) (0.37) (0.35)
observations 7,963 7,888 7,810 7,783 7,734 7,700 7,517
Notes: SEP is the Spanish acronym for the targeted voucher program.
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4.4 Empirical Analysis
4.4.1 Identification Strategy and Preliminary Results
Despite the fact that Chile’s educational system is a school choice one, where
students can freely choose schools regardless of their location of residence, time
and travel costs allow for the existence of differentiated local school markets. In
fact, previous research has found that primary school students avoid traveling long
distances to go to school, with the average student traveling less than 2.78 km (1.7
mi) (Gallego and Hernando, 2009; Chumacero et al., 2011).8 In addition, about
90% of students attend a school that is located in the same municipality of their
residence.9 This makes of municipalities a good candidate to define local school
markets.1011
The particular design of the targeted voucher reform implies that some munic-
ipalities are more affected by the program than others, depending on their share of
disadvantaged students that are eligible to participate in the program. To make this
point clear, take the extreme case of a municipality in which no disadvantaged stu-
dent lives. The targeted voucher reform has zero effect in this municipality, in terms
8Chumacero et al. (2011) calculate an average distance from home to school in the metropolitan
area of Santiago of 2.57 km (1.6 mi) for 4th grade students that attend public schools, and of 2.78
km (1.7 mi) for students that attend private-voucher schools.
9This is the case for the sample of 4th graders that I use in my empirical analysis.
10See Topel (1986) and Card (2001) for other papers that use political and administrative bound-
aries to define local markets.
11Notice that my definition of a school market in this chapter is different from the definition I
use in chapter 3 of this dissertation. I choose the current definition because it involves smaller
geographical areas, and it therefore provides somewhat greater variation for the identification
strategy. Either way, for most of the markets, both definitions coincide. Hsieh and Urquiola
(2006) also use municipalities to define local school markets in the Chilean context.
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adding new funds, because no student is eligible to participate in the program. On
the contrary, a municipality in which all students come from disadvantaged families
has the maximum potential of receiving additional funds.12 Thus, it is possible to
argue that different municipalities have different intensities of treatment, and that
these intensities depend on the share of disadvantaged students that reside in the
municipalities.
To avoid endogeneity issues when conducting my empirical analysis, I use
students’ municipality of residence the year before the targeted voucher program
was introduced.13 This variable is highly correlated with the current municipality of
residence (88.4% of 4th graders in 2008-2011 live in the same municipality than they
did in 2007), and is free of endogeneity issues because the residential decision was
taken before the program was announced and implemented. Figure 4.2 displays the
distribution of municipalities according to their share of disadvantaged students the
year before the targeted voucher reform took place. Panel A presents the distribution
at the municipality of residence level. The support of the distribution is complete
in the [0,1] range.14 Also, about half of the municipalities have between 20% and
50% of disadvantaged students, and only few have less than 10% or more than 90%
of disadvantaged students. Panel B presents the same distribution but weighted by
each municipality’s student population. The municipalities with the highest shares
12I am careful to say that this increase in the funding is only “potential”, because it primarily
depends on the schools deciding to participate in the program. However, as I show below, the
share of disadvantaged students in the municipality highly predicts the likelihood that a school
chooses to participate in the targeted voucher.
13As opposed to the municipality of residence before the introduction of the program, the current
municipality of residence is subject to endogeneity issues via, for example, endogenous migration
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1988).
14The exact support of the distribution is [0.008,1].
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of disadvantaged students are also those with the least number of students. Also,
more than half of students live in municipalities that had a share of disadvantaged
students before the introduction of the reform within the range [0.1,0.4]. All in all,
it is possible to argue the distribution of this “intensity of treatment” variable is
well suited for my statistical analysis.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Municipalities According to their Share of Disadvantaged
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Notes: Panels A and B display histograms for the distribution of municipalities according to their
share of disadvantaged students one year before the introduction of the targeted voucher reform
(2007). Panel A displays the distribution at the municipality level, and Panel B presents the
distribution weighted by each municipality’s population of 4th grade students in the first year of
the program (2008).
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The basic idea of the identification strategy can be illustrated by using a
standard diff-in-diff rationale. Adopting a similar strategy as in Card (1992) and
Duflo (2001), I use the evidence from Figures 4.3 and 4.4 to define three categories for
the share of disadvantaged students in the municipality of residence one year before
the introduction of the reform.15 Figure 4.3 displays a nonparametric estimation of
the probability that a school joins the targeted voucher program in the first year of
its implementation (2008) with respect to the municipality’s share of disadvantaged
students before the reform. The estimated function is monotonically increasing in
the domain [0,0.5], going from 0.4 to about 0.9 in the probability, and remains
fairly constant at 0.9 thereafter. Figure 4.4 plots a nonparametric estimation of
the probability that a student attends a SEP school one year after the reform with
respect to the municipality of residence’s share of disadvantaged student one year
before the reform. The estimated function is monotonically increasing in the domain
[0,0.5], going from 0.4 to about 0.9 in the probability, remains stable in the domain
(0.5,0.7], at 0.9 in the probability, and increases to almost 1 in the domain (0.7,1].
With this information at hand, I define the following three levels of intensity of
treatment for local school markets (i.e. municipalities): high, for municipalities
with more than 50% of disadvantaged students; medium, for municipalities with
20%-50% of disadvantaged students; and low, for municipalities with less than 20%
of disadvantaged students. The choice of the levels responds to the fact that all
students in a municipality with a high level of intensity of treatment are almost sure
15Neumark and Wascher (1992) also use a similar identification strategy to estimate the effects
of minimum wage laws on employment in the U.S.
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to attend a SEP school, and that the typical student in a municipality with a low
intensity of treatment is as likely to attend a SEP school as to attend a non-SEP
school. The rest of the municipalities are classified to be of medium level.
Figure 4.3: Probability that a School Joins the Targeted Voucher Program, by
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Notes: This figure displays a nonparametric estimation of the probability that a school joins the
targeted voucher reform (SEP) in the first year of its implementation (2008), with respect to the
percentage of disadvantaged students in the municipality one year before the introduction of the
targeted voucher reform (2007).
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Figure 4.4: Probability that a Student Attends a SEP School, by Municipality’s
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Notes: This figure displays a nonparametric estimation of the probability that a student attends a
SEP school in the first year of the targeted voucher reform (2008), with respect to the percentage
of disadvantaged students in the municipality one year before the introduction of the targeted
voucher reform (2007).
Figure 4.5 plots a dynamic version of Figure 4.4, where we observe that the
probability that a student attends a SEP school is fairly constant over time and by
intensity of treatment level, confirming the robustness of my choice for the definition
of the three intensity levels.
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Figure 4.5: Probability that a Student Attends a SEP School, by Municipality’s
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Notes: I define and use three different levels of concentration of disadvantaged students in the
municipality one year before the introduction of the targeted voucher reform (2007): low, for
municipalities with less than 20% of disadvantaged students; medium, for municipalities with more
than 20% and less than 50% of disadvantaged students; and high, for municipalities with more
than 50% of disadvantaged students. This figure displays the probability that a student attends
a SEP school in the first four years of the targeted voucher reform (2008-2011), by municipality’s
concentration of disadvantaged students level one year before the introduction of the targeted
voucher reform (2007).
Table 4.3 presents means and standard deviations for test scores one year be-
fore the introduction of the program (2007) and four years after the introduction of
the program (2011), by intensity of treatment level. Test scores are standardized to
have zero mean and standard deviation of one in 2007. Panel A presents means for
verbal scores. In general, students in low-intensity municipalities have higher scores
that students in medium-intensity municipalities, who in turn score higher than
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students in high-intensity municipalities. Average test scores increase in all three
types of municipalities, but they increase more in high-intensity municipalities, fol-
lowed by medium-intensity ones. Simple difference-in-difference estimators can be
constructed by using the change in low-intensity municipalities as a base, and are
shown in columns (4) and (5). The diff-in-diff estimate is 0.007σ (not statistically
different from zero) for medium-intensity markets, and 0.091σ for high-intensity
markets. In order to transform these estimates into effects attributed to the tar-
geted voucher reform, I divide them by the differences in the share of disadvantaged
students between medium/high-intensity markets and low-intensity markets. Such
shares are 15%, 31.4%, and 68.7% for low-, medium-, and high-intensity markets, re-
spectively. Combining these results, we obtain that the average treatment effect on
the treated (Abadie, 2005) of the targeted voucher reform on verbal scores is 0.04σ
for students in medium-intensity markets, and 0.16σ for students in high-intensity
markets. A similar analysis can be done for math scores, by using the statistics
displayed in Panel B. I obtain effects attributed to the targeted voucher reform of
0.27σ and 0.31σ for medium- and high-intensity markets, respectively. These results
are in line with the findings in Neilson (2013).
164
Table 4.3: Test Scores Before and After the Targeted Voucher Reform, by Intensity
of Treatment Level
intensity of treatment level difference
low medium high medium - low high - low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. verbal
test score in 2007 0.070 -0.010 -0.083 -0.080 -0.153
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
test score in 2011 0.297 0.225 0.235 -0.073 -0.062
(0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008)
difference 2011 - 2007 0.228 0.234 0.319 0.007 0.091
(0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011)
B. math
test score in 2007 0.115 -0.008 -0.178 -0.123 -0.293
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
test score in 2011 0.303 0.226 0.181 -0.077 -0.122
(0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
difference 2011 - 2007 0.188 0.233 0.359 0.045 0.171
(0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011)
Notes: The sample consists in all students in 4th grade in public and private-voucher schools for the
years 2007 and 2011. Test scores are standardized with respect to the year 2007. Standard errors in
parentheses. I define and use three different levels of intensity of treatment: low, for municipalities
with less than 20% of disadvantaged students; medium, for municipalities with more than 20%
and less than 50% of disadvantaged students; and high, for municipalities with more than 50% of
disadvantaged students.
I also present difference-in-difference estimates for standardized test-taking
rates. Standardized tests in Chile are mandatory for schools and are scheduled
to be taken simultaneously by all 4th grade students in two specific days, usually
in November, every year.16 To take the tests, students have to normally attend
class those days, just as they do in a regular day of class. Table 4.4 presents test-
taking rates for the years 2007 and 2011, and by intensity of treatment level. Panel
A displays such rates for all students. On average, test-taking rates are highest
16Students in 8th and 10th grades also take standardized tests, every other year.
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in low-intensity school markets, followed by medium-intensity markets, and then
by high-intensity school markets. Also, test-taking rates decreased in all three
types of municipalities between 2007 and 2011. The reduced-form diff-in-diff es-
timated effects of the targeted voucher reform on students’ test-taking rates, using
low-intensity municipalities as benchmark, are −0.7 percentage points (p.p.) for
medium-intensity municipalities, and −2.5 p.p. for high-intensity municipalities.
These numbers imply a treatment on the treated effect attributed to the reform
of −4.3 p.p. for medium-intensity municipalities, and −4.7 p.p. for high-intensity
municipalities. Panel B presents an analogous diff-in-diff exercise as in Panel A, but
only for low-performing students.17 The implied treatment on the treated effects
of the targeted voucher reform on the test-taking rates of low-performing students
are −12.8 p.p. for students in medium-intensity municipalities, and −10.2 p.p. for
students in high-intensity municipalities. These estimates represent considerable
effects of -15.7% and -13.7% in the test-taking rates of low-performing students in
medium- and high-intensity municipalities, respectively. Panel C presents the same
diff-in-diff exercise in test-taking rate as in panels A and B, but for high-performing
students. The implied effects of the targeted voucher program are 4.9 p.p. for stu-
dents in medium-intensity municipalities, and 0.7 p.p. for students in high-intensity
municipalities. The combined results from panels A-C in Table 4.4 show that the
effect of the reform on test-taking rates is entirely driven by the decrease in the
test-taking rate of low-performing students.
17I define low-performing students as students that belong to the lowest quartile in their schools’
GPA distribution. Analogously, I define high-performing students as students that belong to the
highest quartile in their schools’ GPA distribution.
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Table 4.4: Test-taking Rates Before and After the Targeted Voucher Reform, by
Intensity of Treatment Level
intensity of treatment level difference
low medium high medium - low high - low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. all students
test-taking rate in 2007 0.911 0.903 0.883 -0.008 -0.028
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
test-taking rate in 2011 0.880 0.866 0.827 -0.015 -0.053
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
difference 2011 - 2007 -0.031 -0.037 -0.056 -0.007 -0.025
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
B. low-performing students
test-taking rate in 2007 0.844 0.814 0.746 -0.030 -0.098
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
test-taking rate in 2011 0.787 0.736 0.634 -0.050 -0.153
(0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
difference 2011 - 2007 -0.057 -0.078 -0.112 -0.021 -0.055
(0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009)
C. high-performing students
test-taking rate in 2007 0.951 0.955 0.964 0.004 0.013
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
test-taking rate in 2011 0.947 0.958 0.963 0.011 0.017
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
difference -0.005 0.003 -0.001 0.008 0.004
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Notes: The sample consists of all students in 4th grade in public and private-voucher schools for
the years 2007 and 2011. Standard errors in parentheses. I define and use three different levels
of intensity of treatment: low, for municipalities with less than 20% of disadvantaged students;
medium, for municipalities with more than 20% and less than 50% of disadvantaged students; and
high, for municipalities with more than 50% of disadvantaged students. Low-performing students
are students that belong to the lowest quartile in their schools’ GPA distribution. High-performing
students are students that belong to the highest quartile in their schools’ GPA distribution.
Two important remarks can be taken from the preliminary evidence just
shown. First, the targeted voucher reform increased students’ academic performance
(measured by test scores). Second, the reform decreased the representativeness of
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low-performing students in the national standardized tests. The reasons for the
latter effect are unknown and hard to identifiy, but could well relate to strategic
actions taken by schools to the increased pressure from the government to rapidly
increase test scores. More importantly, these results imply that the estimated effects
that I and others studies find for test scores may be biased upwards.18
4.4.2 Main Results
To better exploit the variation in treatment intensity across municipalities, I
generalize the strategy presented above to a regression framework. Specifically, I
estimate the following equation:
yist = γs + λt + δ(postt × intensitys) + εist, (4.1)
where yist is the outcome of interest for student i in municipality of residence before
the reform s in period t, γs is a fixed effect for municipality of residence before the
reform, λt is a year fixed effect, postt is a post-reform indicator, intensitys is the
intensity of treatment (i.e. share of disadvantaged students in the municipality of
residence one year before the reform), and εist is an error term. In the empirical
implementation of this regression I cluster the standard errors at the municipality
of residence before the reform level (Bertrand et al., 2004; Cameron and Miller,
2015). The coefficient of interest is δ, as it captures the effect of the targeted
voucher reform. Note that the treatment parameter identified by this equation is
18See Neilson (2013) and Correa et al. (2014).
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the average treatment effect on the treated (Abadie, 2005), which in this case of
a continuous treatment represents the effect on students residing in municipalities
with a 100% share of disadvantaged students before the reform.
I first estimate equation (4.1) on test scores and test-taking rates, and check
whether the results from Section 4.4.1 are also found in this regression framework.
Panels A and B in Table 4.5 present the results for test scores. Column (1) presents
estimates from specifications not including controls, and column (2) includes the
gender of the student and the share of public schools in the current municipality
of residence as covariates. The estimated effect for verbal is 0.21σ, and the effect
for math is 0.35σ, both statistically significant at all conventional levels. Panel A
in Table 4.6 presents the results for test-taking rate. Columns (1) and (2) show
estimates for all students, columns (3) and (4) do so for low-performing students,
and columns (5) and (6) show results for high-performing students. The estimates
indicate that the targeted voucher reform decreased in 7.9 p.p. students’ test-taking
rate. They also show that the targeted voucher reform decreased in 14.6 p.p. low-
performing students’ test-taking rate. The program had no significant effect on
test-taking rate of high-performing students. This evidence confirms the negative
effect that the reform had on the representativeness of low-performing students in
the sample of students that take the national exams. In addition, it is no longer
possible to claim that the estimated effects found for test scores in Table 4.5 and
in other studies (Neilson, 2013; Correa et al., 2014) are free from representativeness
bias.
To the question of why schools engage in such a strategic behavior, I return
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to the discussion from section 4.1. Schools that participate in the targeted program
are required to meet specific academic goals in the form of average test scores at
the school level. They need to comply with the academic goals in order to secure
the receipt of the new subsidy. Schools are thus incentivized to increase the quality
of the education they provide, and to transform that quality improvement into
higher students’ test scores. However, if schools find it difficult or costly to quickly
raise test scores (Glewwe, 2014; Evans and Popova, 2016a,b), they may look for
alternatives that may help them achieve their goals. One such alternative is to keep
low-performing students to take the tests, thus automatically increasing the school’s
average test score without necessarily changing its quality of education. Moreover,
in the current policy setting, this is an inexpensive way of increasing average test
scores, as there is no penalty for schools engaging in this behavior.
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Notes: All results come from estimation of generalized diff-in-diff regressions that use data for
students one year before and four years after the introduction of the SEP reform. The intensity of
treatment variable is the municipality’s share of disadvantaged students. I report the estimated co-
efficient on the interaction between the dummy for the period after the introduction of the program
and the treatment variable. Specifications with controls include the gender of the student and the
share of public schools in the current municipality of residence. Standard errors are clustered at
the municipality of residence before the program level. ∗∗∗ denotes statistically significance at 99%
level.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. test-taking rate
post× intensity -0.079∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.004
(0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.022) (0.012) (0.012)
observations 414,299 414,299 108,477 108,477 99,938 99,938
R2 0.011 0.013 0.032 0.032 0.007 0.007
B. class attendance
post× intensity 0.028∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
observations 414,299 414,299 108,477 108,477 99,938 99,938
R2 0.045 0.045 0.048 0.048 0.050 0.050
Notes: All results come from estimation of generalized diff-in-diff regressions that use data for
students one year before and four years after the introduction of the SEP reform. The intensity
of treatment variable is the municipality’s share of disadvantaged students. I report the estimated
coefficient on the interaction between the dummy for the period after the introduction of the
program and the treatment variable. Low-performing students are students that belong to the
lowest quartile in their schools’ GPA distribution. High-performing students are students that
belong to the highest quartile in their schools’ GPA distribution. Specifications with controls
include the gender of the student and the share of public schools in the current municipality of
residence. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality of residence before the program level.
∗∗∗ denotes statistically significance at 99% level.
Next, I investigate whether the observed effect of the targeted voucher reform
on students’ test-taking rate responds to a decrease in general class attendance.
Panel B in Table 4.6 presents results from estimating equation (4.1) for students’
average annual class attendance rate. The estimates show a positive effect attributed
to the reform. The point estimates are 2.8 p.p., 4 p.p., and 1.9 p.p. for all, low-
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performing, and high-performing students, respectively. Additional evidence sup-
porting this finding is presented in Panel C in Table 4.5, that displays the estimated
effect of the targeted voucher reform on students’ chronic absenteeism. Chronic ab-
senteeism is defined as missing ten percent of a school year for any reason (Balfanz
and Byrnes, 2012), and is found to be strongly linked to low academic achievement
and high dropout rates.19 The results indicate that the targeted voucher reform
reduced chronic absenteeism in 17.2 p.p., out of a base of 20.7% in 2007, a result
that is both statistically significant and economically important. These two pieces
of evidence highlight the positive effect that targeted voucher program had on at-
tendance, an important input for academic achievement. However, such results do
not help to explain the observed decrease in the test-taking rates attributed to the
reform.
As a final empirical exercise, I estimate equation (4.1) for selected variables
that measure educational inputs. I do so to investigate whether the targeted voucher
reform had an effect on schools’ incentive to invest in school quality. Table 4.7
reports the effect of the targeted voucher reform on class size, pupil-teacher ratio,
% of multigrade classes, and average teacher experience in years, all measured at
the school level. I weigh each observation by schools’ 4th grade enrollment. Column
(1) presents estimates from specifications not including controls, while column (2)
includes a dummy for public school as a covariate. Class size, pupil-teacher ratio,
and average teacher experience are transformed to logs, so the estimates should be
interpreted as percent changes. The results suggest that schools used the extra funds
19See Balfanz and Byrnes (2012), and Gottfried (2014).
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they received from the targeted voucher to invest in educational inputs. Specifically,
the reform reduced class size in 8.1%, reduced the pupil-teacher ratio in 5.3%, and
reduced the percentage of multigrade classes in 7.8 p.p. (out of a base of 19.2%
in 2007). The program also reduced the average years of experience of teachers, in
about 11.6%.
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Table 4.7: Effect of the Targeted Voucher Reform on School Inputs
(1) (2)
A. class size









C. % multigrade classes




D. avg. teacher experience





Notes: All results come from estimation of generalized diff-in-diff regressions that use data for
schools one year before and four years after the introduction of the SEP reform. Each school
observation is weighted by school’s enrollment in 4th grade. The intensity of treatment variable
is the municipality’s share of disadvantaged students. I report the estimated coefficient on the
interaction between the dummy for the period after the introduction of the targeted voucher
program and the treatment variable. Specifications with controls include a dummy for public
school. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality of residence before the program level. ∗∗∗
denotes statistically significance at 99% level. ∗∗ denotes statistically significance at 95% level. ∗
denotes statistically significance at 90% level.
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In summary, I find that the targeted voucher program had positive effects
on test scores four years after its implementation. However, those results should
be taken with caution, as I also find that the reform significantly decreased the
likelihood that low-performing students take the national standardized tests, a result
that cannot be explained by the observed increase in class attendance due to the
program. I also find that schools invested in educational inputs, namely class size,
pupil-teacher ratio, and % of multigrade classes. Both the test-taking rate and the
school inputs effects can certainly help explain the large effects of the reform on test
scores.
4.5 Conclusions
In this paper, I present evidence regarding the strategic response of schools to a
targeted voucher reform in Chile. Specifically, I use a difference-in-differences strat-
egy to document that schools in local markets that were most affected by the reform
engaged in the strategic selection of high-performing students to take the national
standardized exams, as a way of complying with the requirement of increasing the
school’s average performance on standardized test scores. My results show that the
reform decreased the likelihood of taking the standardized tests for low-performing
students in about 14.6 percentage points four years after the introduction of the
reform. Moreover, the reform did not have a significant impact on the likelihood
of taking the exams for high-performing students. I also show that the reform had
a positive impact on schools’ investment in educational inputs, especially in those
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related to the hiring of new teachers.
My findings highlight the importance of taking into account the supply re-
sponses to policy changes when evaluating educational programs. The general en-
thusiasm generated by recent studies documenting large impacts of the Chilean
targeted voucher reform on students’ performance in standardized test scores must
be taken with caution, as those studies do not account for schools’ reactions to the
reform.
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Appendix A: Data Sources
I conduct my empirical analyses using various administrative and survey data
sets from Chile. Most of the data were obtained from the Ministry of Education
and the Agencia de Calidad de la Educación, the government’s agency in charge
of conducting all national standardized examinations in the primary and secondary
levels. The richness of the data is remarkable. It covers all students and schools in
the country, and provides a large set of demographic variables for students and of
educational inputs and management characteristics for schools. Among the data for
school inputs is a detailed set of variables for teachers, that includes information on
their education credentials and teaching specialization. The data allows researchers
to track students from first grade until they finish their formal schooling, including
higher education. It additionally provides information on the performance of stu-
dents in every standardized test they take throughout their schooling years. Panel
data samples for schools and teachers can also be constructed. The years spanned
by these data sets are 1999-2016, where different variables are available for different
years.
In addition to the data obtained from the government’s education branches,
in chapter 3 I also use data from the most important national household survey,
178
CASEN (Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica Nacional), and from the na-
tional standardized college admission exams, PSU (Prueba de Selección Universi-
taria). Chapter 4 also complements the base data with my own collection and
construction of records for students’ residence geographic coordinates and private
schools’ tuition. Each of these chapters elaborate on the importance of the added
data to conduct the corresponding empirical analysis.
Below, I provide a list of each administrative and survey data set used in this
dissertation, along with its corresponding description.
• National standardized exams, SIMCE (Sistema de Medición de la Calidad de
la Educación), student-level.
This data provides information on students’ test scores in various primary
and secondary grades and for various subjects, including verbal, mathematics,
social sciences, and natural sciences. It also provides information on students’
gender and grade.
• SIMCE’s questionnaire to parents and tutors.
This data consists in the responses to a survey that parents and tutors answer
during the days when the national standardized tests are taken. The survey
is voluntary, though about more than 90% of parents respond it. It provides
information on students’ household size, house amenities, and time use, total
number of books available in the household, household total monthly income,
parents and tutors’ time use, education, indigenous identification, occupation,
health insurance, participation in social programs, reasons for the choice of
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the school, beliefs on the student’s future educational attainment, satisfaction
with the school, knowledge of school’s average performance in standardized
tests, total monthly expenses related to the student’s education other than
tuition, and school’s admission criteria, tuition, and fees.
• National standardized exams, SIMCE, school-level.
This data provides information on schools’ average test scores in various grades
and for various subjects, including verbal, mathematics, and social and natural
sciences. It also provides information on schools’ municipality, management
type, socio-economic category of the population served by the school, urban
status, and number of students taking the tests.
• Registry of students.
This data provides information on students’ gender, date of birth, age, munic-
ipality of residence, type and level of education, grade, class, grade repetition
status, special education status, and various characteristics of the school of
attendance, such as municipality, management type, single/double shift sched-
ule, and urban status.
• Registry of schools.
This data provides information on schools’ municipality, management type,
urban status, address, and type and level of education offered.
• National standardized college admission exams, PSU (Prueba de Selección Uni-
versitaria).
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This data provides information on students’ college admission test scores for
four different subjects: verbal, mathematics, social sciences, and natural sci-
ences. These exams are not mandatory, but are essential in determining stu-
dents’ chances of attending college. The data also provides information on
students’ birth date, home address, level of education of the parents, occupa-
tion of the parents, high school attended, high school GPA, preference ranking
of higher education institutions-majors, among others.
• National household survey, CASEN (Encuesta de Caracterización Socioeconómica
Nacional).
The CASEN series of household surveys corresponds to the most important
piece of socio-economic information in Chile. It is used to inform public po-
lices, and contains extensive information on individuals’ education, health,
employment, etc. It is nationally representative at the municipality level.
• Registry of students in higher education institutions.
This data provides detailed information on students’ enrollment in higher edu-
cation institutions, including the institution’s name, major of study, geograph-
ical location where the classes are held, and students’ age, gender, and birth
date.
• Registry of individuals completing a higher education degree.
This data provides information for all students earning a higher education
degree. It also contains detailed information on the degree (major and higher
education institution), the time needed to complete the degree, the official
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duration of the degree, the exact date when the degree was completed, and
students’ age, gender, and birth date.
• Registry of students that are eligible to participate in the targeted voucher pro-
gram.
This data provides information on the characteristics of students that are eli-
gible to participate in the targeted voucher program. It provides information
on students’ gender, date of birth, program participation status, level of ed-
ucation, grade, single/double shift schedule, and on the type of management,
and urban status of the school attended by the student.
• Registry of schools that participate in the targeted voucher program.
This data provides information on the characteristics of the schools that partic-
ipate in the targeted voucher program. Information on schools’ municipality,
type of management, urban status, number of disadvantaged students that
are eligible for the targeted voucher subsidy, and number of students that are
beneficiary of the targeted voucher is available.
• Registry of students’ academic performance.
This data provides information on students’ gender, date of birth, municipality
of residence, type and level of education, grade, class, GPA, average class
attendance, and various characteristics of the school of attendance, such as
municipality, type of administration, and urban status.
• Registry of schools’ summary of enrollment.
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This data provides information on schools’ municipality, type of management,
urban status, male enrollment by education type and level, female enrollment
by education type and level, total enrollment by education type and level, total
enrollment, number of single-grade classes by education type and level, total
number of single-grade classes, number of multigrade classes by education type
and level, and total number of multigrade classes.
• Registry of teachers.
This data provides information on teachers’ gender, date of birth, education
degree, subject specialization, institution attended, graduation year, and dura-
tion of the degree studied. It also provides information on the characteristics
of all schools in which each teacher is hired (municipality, type of manage-
ment, rural status), and on the teachers’ primary and secondary roles (e.g.
teacher, principal, supervisor), type of contract, hours contracted, teaching
hours, experience, tenure, and teaching subject and level of education.
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